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Homosexuality is an emotional and controversial issue in
our society. It causes fear and disgust among many people.
This may well result in condemnation of this decision-
but, if so, the critics should at least have a clear under-
standing that this decision has little effect upon the general
public.'
Wife, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union
(A.C.L.U.), cite articles that indicate there are no signifi-
cant differences among heterosexual parents and homosex-
ual divorced parents and their children. Of course, the trial
court has the authority to find the evidence presented not
credible. Since it is our duty to protect the moral growth
and the best interests of the minor children, we find Wife's
arguments lacking. Union, Missouri is a small, conservative
community-... Homosexuality is not openly accepted or
widespread.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Disjunctive legal change is often accompanied by a period of
frantic activity as the competing forces of stasis and evolution vie
for domination. Nowhere is the battle for legal change likely to
be more sharply joined than when the findings of modern science,
in their varied and multifarious forms, are pitted directly against
prevailing moral or societal precepts. Some of the most far-reaching
and consequential changes in modern legal doctrine have been
produced by the clash between contemporary scientific insights
and tradition-bound morality. Consider, for example, the issues
of school desegregation, abortion, and the death penalty. In Brown
v. Board of Education,3 the United States Supreme Court over-
turned the separate-but-equal doctrine enunciated in Plessy v.
I. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1147 (N.D. Tex. 1982), opinion
supplemented, 106 F.R.D. 526, rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
2. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (footnote
and citation omitted).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Ferguson4 based, inter alia, on "modern authorities" documenting
the harm accruing to African-American children as the result of
attending segregated schools. 5 In Roe v. Wade,6 the Court affirmed
the right of women to have abortions within a trimester framework
heavily reliant upon medical knowledge of fetal development. In
current death-penalty jurisprudence, social science has been impli-
cated in a number of discrete contexts, including the deterrent role
of capital punishment, 7 predictions of the future dangerousness of
offenders, 8 the death-qualification of jurors, 9 racial discrimination
in the imposition of the death penalty, 0 and the execution of
minors," although the Supreme Court continues to uphold its
constitutionality. 12
One of the latest incarnations of this trend is the current battle
over the legal recognition of gay "rights."' 3 In recent history,
4
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
5. Famous footnote 11 of that opinion provided the results of various
pieces of social science research.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
8. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
9. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968).
10. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
11. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
12. Acker has argued that the introduction of social science information in
death penalty cases, while not directly affecting the final outcome of these cases,
has had a significant impact upon the resulting opinions: "To be perceived as
legitimate, the opinions cannot for long simply ignore or distort the underlying
factual evidence. Social science findings may serve as a check, and perhaps
ultimately as a corrective mechanism to assure the continued legitimacy of the
Court's death penalty decisions." James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme
Court Death Penalty Cases: Citation Practices and Their Implications, 8 JusT.
Q. 421, 439 (1991).
13. The word "rights" is used advisedly in this context because gay indi-
viduals have been unable to secure many legal protections. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). But see, Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551 (1993) (discussing the
gay rights movement).
14. The legal system's "recognition" of gay individuals as such appears to
correspond roughly with the gay rights movement, which according to some
commentators began in the 1960s. See Lawrence Goldyn, Gratuitous Language
in Appellate Cases Involving Gay People: "Queer Baiting" from the Bench, 3
POL. BEHAV. 31 (1981); Allan Spear, The U.S. Constitution and Gay America,
10 HAM NE L. REV. 159 (1987). For a more expansive view of the gay rights
movement, see Cain, supra note 13.
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the courts have been inundated by gay litigants seeking the rights
and protections already afforded other discrete groups within
society. 5 In the resulting legal skirmishes, 6 gay individuals are
resorting with increasing regularity to the sciences in an effort to
overcome the moral opprobrium surrounding homosexuality. 7 As
in the integration, abortion, and death penalty contexts, litigants
lacking the weapons of legal doctrine, historical protection, or
social consensus, have turned to the weapons 8 that are available-
information provided by science and social science.
The judicial opinions which have resulted from the onslaught
of gay litigants have not remained untouched by the scientific
information adduced by them. To the contrary, these opinions
reflect a heavy influx of science. Two recent examples from state
supreme courts cogently illustrate the utilization of scientific or
15. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985)
(Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing a
potential equal protection claim based on homosexuality).
First, homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of
this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe oppro-
brium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly,
members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights
openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically
been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to
say that discrimination against homosexuals is "likely ... to reflect the
deep-seated prejudice rather than ... rationality." (citation omitted).
State action taken against members of such groups based simply on
their status as members of the group traditionally has been subjected to
strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny by this Court.
Id. at 1014 (footnote omitted).
16. "What can be seen is that on all civil fronts, the courts are the
battleground as gay men and women seek equal treatment and justice in the
American system." Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference
Law, 30 DRAKE L. Rnv. 311, 346 (1980-81).
17. Compare Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers-"To hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching," 478 U.S. at 197-with the
approach taken by one scholar in the gay rights area-"Morality laws based on
tradition rather than science do not withstand the test of time," Shirley A.
Wiegand, Using State Constitutions to Challenge Sodomy Laws: Commonwealth
of Kentucky v. Wasson, AALS meeting (Jan. 5, 1992).
18. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378, for Justice Scalia's characterization of
social science as a "weapon" within the context of death penalty cases. Justice
Scalia states: "The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth
Amendment; and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely
scientific evidence is not an available weapon."
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social science information in gay rights cases. In Baehr v. Lewin, 9
one justice of the Hawaii Supreme Court, in considering the right
of gay individuals to marry, wrestled with the scientific question
of whether homosexuality is biologically predetermined and thus
is an immutable characteristic worthy of recognition under equal
protection analysis. The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in
Kentucky v. Wasson,20 striking down the state sodomy law under
both right to privacy and equal protection analyses, explicitly
referred to seven expert witnesses, ranging from a cultural anthro-
pologist to a professor of medicine, and extensive amici curiae
briefs.2'
These are not isolated examples. Rather, as this Article will
demonstrate, a disproportionally large number of gay rights opi-
nions contain citations and references to social science information.
These judicial opinions have become artifacts22 of the battle be-
tween modern science and existing moral conceptions of homosex-
uality and provide a discrete microcosm within which to examine
science's contribution to legal change. The lessons derived from
gay rights cases may help to elucidate other contexts in which
science and morality meet head-on. 23
Part II.A. of this Article presents original empirical research
on courts' citation and reference to social science in legal opinions
19. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In response to Baehr, the Hawaii legislature
recently passed a bill banning same-sex marriage. See 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217.
20. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
21. Two additional examples also illustrate the proliferation of social science
information in increasingly diverse contexts involving gay litigants. The question
of whether gay men and lesbian women should be permitted in the military has
received extensive attention from social science scholars. See, e.g., GAYS AND THE
MILITARY: JOSEPH STEFFAN VERSUS THE UNITED STATES (Marc Wolinsky & Kenneth
Sherrill eds., 1993) (including affidavits of seven social scientists on various
topics). A second example concerns the question of security clearances for gay
individuals. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Gay People and Government Security
Clearances: A Social Science Perspective, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1035 (1990).
22. Murray Levine & Barbara Howe, The Penetration of Social Science
into Legal Culture, 7 LAW & POL'Y 173 (1985) (arguing that published court
opinions are important artifacts of legal culture).
23. As one author put it:
It may be a worthwhile enterprise to devote increased effort to under-
standing more precisely the nature of those situations which offer the
greatest opportunities for the application of social science research. Only
through understanding can there be a realistic appraisal of the place of
social science in the legal process.
Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Some Limits on the Application of Social Science Research
in the Legal Process, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 847, 847 (1973).
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involving gay individuals. It reports the results of a study com-
paring the frequency of social science citations in four substantive
gay rights areas: child custody and visitation, employment discrim-
ination, first amendment, and criminal sodomy cases. In addition
to the substantive legal issue, the study also examines the impact
of four other variables, 24 such as whether the court engaged in
constitutional analysis, on courts' rates of social science citation.
Finally, the study employs two qualitative measures, degree of
detail and degree of reliance, in order to assess how the social
science information was used when it was cited. Part II.B. com-
pares the results of this research to extant research on the citation
patterns of courts and concludes that social science is used in an
unusually large number of gay rights cases.
Part III of this Article attempts to answer the question of why
social science is cited so frequently in gay rights cases. The answer
appears to lie at the intersection of three synergistic forces: (1) the
recency of gay rights cases and the increased acceptance of social
science information within modern legal culture; (2) courts' incli-
nations to cite social science in their opinions for various purposes,
largely justificatory, (e.g., using social science to debunk prevailing
myths about homosexuality) in light of the controversial nature of
homosexuality; and (3) the concerted efforts of three distinct
groups, gay litigants, civil rights organizations, and scientific as-
sociations, to systematically provide social science information to
the courts. None of these explanations by itself is adequate to
explain heightened use of social science in gay rights cases. Rather,
it is only when they are viewed as interactive forces set in a larger
explanatory framework that a satisfactory understanding is possi-
ble.
This Article concludes with a prediction about the future use
of science and social science in gay rights litigation. Until legal
change is achieved in this area, we can expect that litigants will
continue to introduce, and courts will continue to incorporate in
their opinions, social science information. The battle between
traditional moral precepts and scientific notions of human behavior
will continue within this controversial context. The very necessity
of the citation of social science is inextricably interwoven in the
failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to augur change in this area.
Since an evolution in the legal doctrine regarding gay individuals
has not occurred, it is likely that social science will continue to be
the weapon of choice on the battlefield for legal change.
24. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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II. RESEARCH ON COURTS' CITATION AND REFERENCE TO SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LEGAL OPINIONS INVOLVING GAY INDIVIDUALS
A. The Research Project
1. Introduction and Methodology
This section presents the results of empirical research on
the citation and reference to social science in gay rights cases.
The present study continues a fairly long and well-developed
research tradition 25 of systematically studying court's citation
25. See THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAwyERs: INFOR-
MATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1978); Robert D. Archibald,
Stare Decisis and the Ohio Supreme Court, 9 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 23 (1957);
Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965
Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports":
Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October
Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1 (1983); Lawrence M. Friedman,
et. al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 773 (1981); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Gary B. Melton, The Impact of
Social Science Research on the Judiciary, in REFORmINO THE LAW: IMPACT OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987); Robert A. Kagan,
et. al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 961 (1978);
Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical
Analysis, 15 WAKE FOasT L. REv. 39 (1979); Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact
of Legal Periodicals, 1976 Am. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 227; John H. Merryman,
Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of
the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381
(1977) [hereinafter Citations]; John H. Merryman, The Authority of Authority:
What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954)
[hereinafter Authority]; Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United
States Supreme Court, 7 KAN. L. REV. 477 (1959); William L. Reynolds, II, The
Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance-Part 1I: Crafts-
manship and Decision-Making, 38 MD. L. REV. 148 (1978); John Scurlock,
Scholarship and the Courts, 32 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 228 (1964); Louis J.
Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme
Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REv. 131 (1986); Mary A. Bobinski,
Comments, Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 965 (1985); William L. Turner, Comment, Legal Periodicals: Their Use in
Kansas, 7 KAN. L. REV. 490 (1959); Thomas L. Hafemeister, The Impact of
Social Science Materials on the Judiciary: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
(1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska (Lincoln)), ab-
stract in 49 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 2924B (1989); John W. Johnson, The
Dimensions of Non-Legal Evidence in the American Judicial Process; The Su-
preme Court's Use of Extra-Legal Materials in the Twentieth Century (1974)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) abstract in 35 DISSER-
TATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 1132A (1974); Victor G. Rosenblum, Report of the Uses
of Social Science in Judicial Decision Making, Unpublished research report to
the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. (1977).
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patterns. 26 Briefly, and without excessive methodological detail, 27
the study identified all available28 legal opinions29 involving gay
26. This study, like its predecessors, used judicial opinions or written
decisions as the primary source of "observation," data collection, and analysis,
and employed a basic citation count methodology. On the one hand, considerable
information can be gleaned from studying the written decisions of judges:
Appellate court opinions, carefully indexed and preserved in law
libraries, are a tremendous resource for historians and social scientists.
... [T]hese appellate opinions also are crucial documents for any
study of judicial culture. The reasoning of the judges, over the years,
reveals judges' notions of law and of the judicial role; it is an essential
window into the legal culture of the judges. The style of opinions is as
good an indicator as we have of what counts as sound legal reasoning
for any given era.
Friedman et al., supra note 25, at 773.
On the other hand, although judicial opinions are quite valuable and in-
formative, there are certain limitations inherent in their use as data:
[T]he judicial opinion is at best an imperfect instrument for revealing
the data and premises considered by judges to have been important in
reaching their decisions. The office of the opinion purportedly is to
explain the thinking processes of judges, to give reasons in the language
and logic familiar to lawyers for the decisions reached.
Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary
System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61
VA. L. REv. 1187, 1192 (1975).
27. For a complete discussion of the methodology utilized in this study,
see Patricia J. Falk, Courts' Citation and Reference to Social Science in Legal
Opinions Involving Gay Individuals (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Nebraska (Lincoln)), abstract in 49 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L
2923B (1989).
28. The study employed three basic steps in -identifying the four populations
of relevant cases: (1) analyzing law review articles, which had collected these
cases, and extracting all case references, see, e.g., Rivera, Recent Developments,
supra note 16; (2) conducting LEXIS computer searches using key phrases (e.g.,
"child custody and homosexual! or gay or lesbian! or sexual orientation or sexual
preference or affectional orientation or affectional preference"); and (3) searching
American Law Reports annotations, including the pocket part and later case
service, see, e.g., Wanda E. Wakefield, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of
Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 1297 (1981).
Also, with respect to the criminal area, which was broader than the other three
areas, the author searched the Decennial Digests using West key number 357
Sodomy K1.
29. The author excluded six types of opinions from analysis: (1) opinions
without text; (2) non-judicial opinions; (3) synopses and abridged opinions; (4)
unpublished opinions; (5) purely procedural opinions; and (6) opinions involving
transsexual persons or transvestites. In addition, the author also excluded certain
opinions within the four substantive areas, such as criminal sodomy cases in-
volving minors. See Falk, supra note 27, for a complete discussion of these
exclusions.
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individuals in four substantive areas-child custody and visitation
(CC),30 employment discrimination (ED), 3' first amendment (FA),32
and criminal sodomy (CS)33 -which were decided through 1987. 34
The study randomly selected 3- 191 cases for further analysis along
a number of dimensions. First, the study counted the number of
citations and references to social science in each of the four
substantive areas and then compared the frequencies of citation
across these contexts. The study defined the term "citation and
reference to social science" to include three possible sources of
information: 36 (1) citations to written works, legal or non-
30. The central issue in this sample of cases was whether homosexual
.parents, either lesbian mothers or gay fathers, should be permitted to have
custody of, or visitation rights with respect to, their children.
31. The basic issue in the employment discrimination sample was whether
a private business or governmental entity (local, state, or federal) could discrim-
inate against an employee based upon sexual orientation without offending
constitutional or statutory principles.
32. This sample consisted of 'cases in which gay individuals and organiza-
tions asserted their rights under the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
33. Criminal sodomy cases involved the issue of a state's ability to criminally
prosecute gay individuals for engaging in adult, consensual, same-sex, sexual
conduct.
34. Since the study was conducted in 1988, 1987 was the last year for
which opinions were selected for inclusion. Although not empirical, there is
considerable anecdotal evidence that the citation of social science has continued,
if not intensified, in more recent gay rights cases. See, e.g., Marriage of Diehl,
582 N.E.2d 281, 292 (II1. Ct. App. 1991), leave to appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 20
(III. 1992) (CC); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (CC);
Collins v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173, at *3, *8 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (CC);
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 283-84 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (CC); Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 590-91
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994), petition for review granted and opinion superseded by 874
P.2d 901 (Cal. 1994) (ED); Buttino v. FBI, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4659, at *25
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (ED); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1547-49 (D. Kan.
1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2445 (1993)
(ED); Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1, 33-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (FA); Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (FA);
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235,
1237 (S.D. Ohio 1993), 860 F. Supp. 417, 424-26 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (FA);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Ky. 1992).
35. Identification of the relevant populations of cases yielded 92 ED, 71
CC, 68 FA, and 41 CS opinions. See Falk, supra note 27, at app. A-D, for a
complete list of these cases. Since the four substantive samples contained an
unequal number of cases, the author randomly selected 50 cases in the first three
samples, while using the entire population of 41 CS cases.
36. The present study, like previous research, counted all citations and
references to social science, irrespective of whether the court approved of or
disagreed with the information.
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legal,3 7 containing social science; (2) references to experts in the
social sciences; and (3) references to generalized bodies of
knowledge 8 within the social sciences (e.g., psychologists have
found that .... ).39 The study collected two types of frequency
data: the number of individual citations (i.e., each different source
of information cited) and the number of multiple citations (i.e.,
additional citations to the same source).
4
0
Second, the study examined the impact of four other variables
or case factors, aside from substantive area, on courts' citation
and reference to social science. 41 More specifically, the study
37. Social science may appear in both "legal" and "nonlegal" publications.
"By citing law reviews, a court can perhaps bootleg 'nonlegal' premises into its
decisions, or deal with 'legal' considerations broader than those usually dealt
with." Friedman et al., supra note 25, at 814.
38. An example of the third category found Within the studied cases is as
follows: "This court takes judicial notice that there is no consensus on what
causes homosexuality, but there is substantial consensus among experts that being
raised by a homosexual parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will
become homosexual." Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (emphasis added).
39. The precise operationalization of "citations (and references) to social
science," was as follows:
Any language in a judicial opinion which reflected a social scientific (i.e.,
social, psychological, psychiatric, quasi-medical, or non-natural scientific) fact
(i.e., based upon or deduced from research) or opinion (i.e., based upon or
deduced from theoretical or non-research writing) and was preceded, followed,
or within close proximity of (i.e., within 25 words):
full (i.e., complete for the particular discipline) or partial (i.e., abbreviated
or shorthand) citation to a social science or legal publication, (e.g., Humans
form interpersonal relationships, 7 J. oF LovE 393 (1985));
(2) a full or partial reference to an expert, authority, or professional
association in a social science discipline (e.g., Professor Love has found that
humans form interpersonal relationships); or
(3) any reference to the social science community or generalized body of
knowledge (e.g., The scientific community has established that humans form
interpersonal relationships).
40. If multiple citations to a single source appeared in the same paragraph
or footnote, then those additional references were not scored separately, but were
counted as one citation. This methodology was consistent with that of other
researchers, see Daniels, supra note 25, at 3-4; Hafemeister & Melton, supra note
25, at 41. However, unlike these other researchers, the author only scored a
subsequent reference as a multiple citation if it was separated from the original
citation by unrelated text.
41. See Falk, supra note 27, for a discussion of the theoretical and/or
empirical literatures supporting the potential impact that these characteristics
might have on courts' citation of social science.
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reanalyzed all 191 cases to determine whether the case concerned
a minor, 42 the court engaged in constitutional analysis, 43 the court
utilized a nexus approach (i.e., drew a connection between ho-
mosexuality and a given behavior), 44 or the court conceptualized
homosexuality as a moral issue.45 Then, for each of these four
case factors, the study compared the frequency of social science
citations in the cases possessing the characteristic (e.g., constitu-
tional analysis cases) with those which did not (e.g., non-consti-
tutional cases).
To supplement the foregoing quantitative analyses, the study
also employed two rudimentary forms of qualitative analysis 46 with
42. A "minor case" was defined for the study as any legal decision in
which the welfare of a minor (someone under the age of majority) or group of
minors was mentioned by the court as a relevant consideration in the determi-
nation of the case.
43. A "constitutional case" was defined for the study as any legal decision
which explicitly referred to and actually decided an issue involving a constitutional
provision or principle.
44. This analysis was first set forth in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161
(D.C. Cir. 1969), an employment discrimination case in which the court held
that an individual could not be dismissed simply because he was gay. Rather,
the court held that it was necessary to establish a "nexus" between the employee's
homosexuality and an inability to perform his job. Id. at 1167. Under a nexus
analysis, the focus shifts from homosexuality per se to a consideration of the
nexus or connection between sexual orientation and any given behavior, e.g., the
ability to be a good employee. Thus, a "nexus analysis case" was defined for
the study as any legal decision which either made explicit reference to the nexus
analysis used in Norton or related cases or .utilized implicit reasoning which
suggested consideration of the relevance of a litigant's homosexuality to the
behavior in dispute.
45. A "moral case" was defined for the study as any legal decision in
which the court explicitly used the word "immoral" or a synonymous term to
describe gay persons or made implicit or subtle statements concerning the morality
of homosexuality or homosexual conduct.
46. While most of the empirical research on courts' use of social science
has used quantitative methods, usually a citation count methodology, there have
been several qualitative or content analysis studies. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis,
"There is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 HAsv. L. Rnv. 1539 (1987) (analyzing the judicial use of psychological
parent theory as espoused by Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Solnit); Levine &
Howe, supra note 22 (operationalizing the "penetration of social science into
legal culture" by tracing the impact of the California Supreme Court's decision
in Hovey, a case involving juror qualification for death penalty cases, on other
state courts); Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial
Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAm. L. 633 (1983-84)
(identifying 15 social fact assumptions articulated in Parham, a case involving
procedural protections for minors admitted to mental hospitals, and examining
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respect to each citation or reference to social science discovered in
the cases. These measures represented an attempt to assess how
social science was being used, when it was used, by legal decision
makers. The two qualitative measures were: (1) the degree of
detail47 and (2) the degree of reliance" the court employed in
making the citation.
49
2. The Results
a. Citations in the Four Substantive Areas
Overall, a relatively high number of gay rights cases contained
citations to social science. In actual and percentage terms, twenty-
five (50%) of the child custody and visitation, -fifteen (30%) of
all reported appellate court decisions citing Parham to determine whether the
assumptions had been accepted and used). For a survey study on the use of
social science information, see Robert D. Felner, et. al., Child Custody Resolu-
tion: A Study of Social Science Involvement and Impact, 18 PRoF. PSYCHOL. 468
(1987) (a survey of a group of randomly selected attorneys and Superior Court
judges in a northeastern state, who specialized in family law). In addition, a few
of the quantitative studies have also employed qualitative measures, see, e.g.,
Rosenblum, supra note 25 (measuring the Court's reliance on social science by
rating the importance of the citation to the proposition for which it was invoked
and the importance of such proposition to the outcome of the case); Bernstein,
supra note 25 (examining the purpose for which the citation was being used).
47. The study assessed degree of detail using a seven-point scale ranging
from "extremely detailed" to "extremely general." In arriving at this score, the
author considered nine factors: (1) length of the court's discussion; (2) whether
the court cited the social science source more than once; (3) whether the reference
appeared in a string citation; (4) whether the opinion quoted directly from the
material or expert; (5) whether the social science was adopted or quoted from
another opinion; (6) whether the court specified the author, expert, or substantive
area; (7) whether the court discussed the author's or expert's qualifications; (8)
whether the court compared the social science to other social science; and (9)
whether the court discussed the limitations of the social science.
48. The study assessed degree of reliance using a seven-point scale ranging
from "extreme reliance" to "extreme rejection," with a midpoint reflecting
neutrality. The following seven questions were used in determining this rating:
(1) Did the court refer to the social science in its holding?; (2) did the court
incorporate the social science into its reasoning?; (3) was the social science
consistent with the results of the opinion? (4) did the court merely mention the
social science without making an evaluation of it; (5) was the social science
inconsistent with the opinion's results?; (6) did the court disparage or distinguish
the social science?; and (7) did the court reject the social science?
49. The study also collected other types of descriptive data, such as opinion
year, level of court, and opinion page length, but generally, these data are
irrelevant to the present analysis.
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the employment discrimination, fifteen (30%) of the first amend-
ment, and nine (22%) of the criminal sodomy cases contained one
or more citations or references to social science. Aggregating the
data across the 191 opinions, sixty-four cases (33.5%) contained
at least one citation to social science.
Contrary to the author's prediction that social science citation
would vary by substantive area, the majority of comparisons across
the four groups did not yield significant results, meaning that the
samples were not statistically different in their frequencies of
citation.50 However, when the study compared the three samples
of civil cases (i.e., CC, ED, and FA) with the CS sample, signif-
icant differences in terms of individual and multiple citations
emerged; the civil cases cited more social science than the criminal
cases. 5'
In addition, most of the comparisons across the four groups
in terms of the type of social science cited (i.e., publications,
experts, or generalized bodies of knowledge) were not significant.
5 2
The four categories of cases were more alike than different in the
citation of various types of social science. The one exception was
a statistically significant difference in the number of individual
citations to experts, who were cited much more commonly in the
CC cases than in the other three substantive areas.5 3
50. In terms of the frequency of individual citations, the CC, ED, FA, and
CS samples had 87, 82, 53, and 23 such citations, respectively. The frequencies
of multiple citations in the four samples were: 107, 122, 83, and 33, respectively.
When the author calculated the mean (i.e., average number of) citations per
opinion in the four samples, the results were 1.74, 1.64, 1.06, and 0.56 mean
individual citations and 2.14, 2.44, 1.66, and 0.80 mean multiple citations,
respectively.
51. The mean individual citations per opinion for the civil cases was 1.48
and for the CS cases it was 0.56. This difference was significant at the 0.05
level. The mean multiple citations per opinion for the civil cases was 2.14 and
for the CS sample it was 0.80. This difference was significant at the 0.025 level.
52. In the CC cases, there were 19 citations to publications, 66 references
to experts, and two references to generalized bodies of knowledge (gbk). The ED
sample contained 53 publication, 27 expert, and two gbk citations. In the FA
cases, 21 publication, 25 expert, and seven gbk citations appeared. Finally, the
CS citations were divided as follows: 10 publication, eight expert, and five gbk
citations.
53. The mean individual citations to experts per opinion was 1.32 for the
CC, 0.54 for the ED, 0.50 for the FA, and 0.195 for the CS samples. This
finding was significant at the 0.01 level. Because this was the only significant
result in terms of citation type, the author performed additional statistical tests
comparing the state and federal cases in the four substantive areas along this
variable. The state cases in the four groups differed significantly in the frequency
of individual citations to experts as did the three samples containing federal cases
(i.e., excluding the all-state CC sample).
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b. The Effect of the Additional Case Factors54
There were significant differences in the frequency of individual
and multiple citations between cases involving minors and those
which did not. The minor cases contained more than twice as
many citations to social science per opinion as the non-minor
cases.5 5 Second, the factor concerning court use of a nexus analysis
also produced significant results in terms of both individual and
multiple citations. Strikingly, the cases using a nexus analysis had
almost four times as many social science citations per opinion as
those which did not.56 Finally, there were no significant differences
in the frequency of citations based on whether the court engaged
in constitutional analysis 57 or conceptualized homosexuality as a
moral issue.
58
c. The Qualitative Results
The ratings for degree of detail demonstrated that the courts
utilizing social science in their opinions did so in a rather superficial
fashion. 9 However, the four samples of cases significantly differed
54. Before proceeding to a discussion of these results, one caveat is in
order regarding the representativeness of these cases along the four case-factor
dimensions. As noted above, the 191 sampled cases were randomly selected from
individual populations in the CC, ED, FA, and CS contexts and were designed
only to be representative of those substantive areas. Thus, because the samples
of "minor" or "non-minor" cases, etc., were derived from these four substantive
area samples, they are only representative of those samples and not the entire
population of gay rights cases. For this reason, the results should be viewed with
some caution.
55. Of the 191 cases, there were 79 "minor cases" and 112 opinions not
involving a minor. For the minor cases, there were 2.02 mean individual and
2.86 mean multiple citations per opinion. The means were 0.76 individual citations
and 1.06 multiple citations per opinion for the non-minor cases.
56. Courts in 73 cases utilized a nexus analysis as compared to 118 cases
in which the courts did not. The mean individual citations for nexus cases was
2.38 and for multiple citations, the mean was 3.41. The means for non-nexus
cases were 0.60 individual citations and 0.81 multiple citations.
57. Overall, 114 cases contained some form of constitutional analysis and
77 were decided on purely non-constitutional grounds. For the constitutional
cases, the means for individual and multiple citations per opinion were 1.32 and
1.91, respectively. The non-constitutional cases had means of 1.23 for individual
and 1.65 for multiple citations.
58. Only 50 out of the 191 cases contained language indicating that the
court had conceptualized homosexuality as a moral issue. In the moral case
sample, the mean for individual citations was 1.68 and the mean for multiple
citations was 2.10. There were 1.41 mean individual and 1.70 mean multiple
citations in the sample containing no moral analysis.
59. The most common rating on a scale, ranging from extremely detailed
(1) to extremely general (7), was seven. The overall mean rating was 5.62.
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in terms of degree of detail.60 The CC sample, which had one of
the highest overall frequencies of citations, was the most general.
On the other hand, the CS cases, which contained the fewest
number of citations, provided the greatest detail.6 1
The degree of reliance data tended to substantiate the fact that
courts are not very adept at evaluating social science and that
generally courts presented this information without an attempt to
incorporate it into the reasoning or holding of the decision. Yet,
the majority of the ratings did indicate that the cited social science
was at least consistent with the decision in the case.6 2 The data
also showed that the four samples differed significantly in the
degree to which courts "relied" upon the cited social science.
63
The courts in the FA sample relied the least upon the social science
which they cited, while the CS cases, which had the lowest rate
of citation, were remarkable for demonstrating the greatest degree
of reliance.6
3. Summary and Conclusion
For the purposes of this Article, the most striking aspects of
these data are twofold. First, fully one-third of the studied gay
rights cases contained one or more citations or references to social
science. The second related finding is that the use of social science
in legal opinions involving gay individuals did not vary significantly
in terms of the substantive area. Thus, the relatively high rate of
citation was maintained across case contexts, rather than being
relegated to isolated types of substantive inquiry. The question
raised by these findings is how the rate of social science citation
in gay rights cases compared to other studies of courts' use of
social science, in particular, and secondary authority, in general.
60. This result was significant at the 0.028 level.
61. The mean ratings for the CC, ED, FA, and CS samples were 6.03,
5.40, 5.58, and 4.96, respectively.
62. On a scale ranging from extreme reliance (1) to extreme rejection (7)
and with the midpoint (4) as a neutral position, the mean ratings were 3.03,
3.33, 3.83, and 2.70 for the CC, ED, FA, and CS samples, respectively. Overall,
the mean rating for degree of reliance was 3.27.
63. This finding was significant at the 0.01 level.
64. The fact that there were only 23 individual citations to social science
in this sample and 12 of those occurred in one case which relied heavily upon
social science influenced these results.
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B. Comparison of These Results to Other Research on Courts'
Citation Patterns
1. Studies on the Citation of Social Science
While there has been a growing body of empirical research on
courts' citation patterns, 65 only a few of these studies have focused
exclusively on the citation of social .science information. In one of
the most closely analogous studies, Rosenblum6 examined 606
cases, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954, 1959, 1964,
1969, and 1974, and found that sixty-three (10.4%) contained
social science data. 67 Rosenblum also discovered that there was
increased usage over time; the Court cited social science infor-
mation in 5.8% of its 1954 cases and in over 12% of its opinions
in 1974.6
8
In an interesting series of studies, Acker examined the citation
of "social science research evidence" by the U.S. Supreme Court
in criminal and death penalty cases. In one study, 69 Acker looked
at 200 randomly selected criminal cases decided between 1958 and
1982, fifty Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cases decided
through 1984, and seven jury cases70 decided between 1970 and
1980. He found that 14% of the criminal, 32% of the exclusionary
rule, and 71.4% of the jury cases contained citations to social
science. In an additional study,7' Acker found that 13.8% of 240
randomly selected criminal cases decided between 1958 and 1987
included at least one citation to social science.
7 2
In two other studies, Acker investigated the Supreme Court's
citation of social science in death penalty cases. First, Acker
examined fifty-one capital punishment cases decided between 1963
and 1985. 73 He found that 46.8% of the cases decided with full
opinions and 43.1% of the entire case sample included social
science research citations.7 4 Subsequently, Acker examined twenty-
65. See supra note 25.
66. Rosenblum, supra note 25.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and
Briefs, 14 L.& HuhiAN BEHAv. 25 (1990).
70. These cases involved issues of jury size and unanimous verdict require-
ments. Id. at 29.
71. James R. Acker, Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court
Criminal Cases, 12 LAw & POL'Y 1 (1990).
72. Id. at 4.
73. Acker, supra note 12.
74. Id. at 424-25.
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eight death penalty cases which were decided between 1986 and
1989 and found that the justices cited social science in 35.7% of
these cases.
75
Although Rosenblum's and Acker's research efforts are the
only existing examinations of courts' citation to social science per
se, several investigators have looked at more discrete categories of
information which fall under the rubric of social science, such as
empirical, technical, or statistical studies, and found even smaller
percentages of cases utilizing this information. 76
75. James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 65, 69 (1993). Collectively, five cases accounted for 95% of the
citations: Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); see also
supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Marvell, supra note 25. Marvell studied the supreme court
of one unnamed, northern industrial state ("the focal court") and, less thor-
oughly, five other courts (the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal, the
Rhode Island and Ohio Supreme Courts, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.) Id. at 6. He analyzed five types of information used by these appellate
courts: (1) issues, (2) legal authority, (3) case facts, (4) social facts, and (5)
empirical data. With respect to empirical data, which he defined as "scientific,
social science, behavioral science, statistical, or other technical information about
what happens in the world," Id. at 186, Marvell found that only 7% of the
opinions at the focal court used such data, generally in the form of a quick
reference to one or two sources. Id. at 187. Marvell also discovered that only I/
6 of the cases containing social facts cited empirical data. Id.
See also Daniels, supra note 25, at 6 (nonlegal sources, including nonlegal
periodicals, treatises, reference sources, government reports, and statistical reports
accounted for 13.4%, 44%, and 28.2% of all secondary citations by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its 1900, 1940, and 1978 cases, respectively); Levine & Howe,
supra note 22, at 181 (reporting on an unpublished study by Feinberg and Straf
that 407 of all federal district court decisions between 1960 and 1979 contained
references to statistical issues); Friedman et al., supra note 25, who emphasize
the conservative citation practices of 16 state supreme courts (SSCs):
We have gone into some detail, because one might have guessed
that, over the years, citation patterns would broaden considerably, that
judges would pay more attention to social science, and that they would
take in a wider range of premises and more diverse knowledge as food
for decisionmaking .... Our data, however, suggest that while the judges
may be absorbing broad learning at the present time, any such learning
is hardly reflected in citation patterns .... SSCs rarely go outside the
law for authority. Social science, economic, or technical studies were
cited in only 0.6% of the 1940-1970 SSC cases. Granted, judges read
books and absorb ideas, values, and concepts from their reading, from
everyday life, from movies, radio, and television. They are exposed to
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2. Studies on the Citation of Secondary Authority
When the current data are compared to studies conducted on
the citation of secondary authority77 in general, the relative inci-
dence of social science citations in gay rights cases appears to be
high as well. Most of this other research indicates that 40-50% of
the studied cases had at least one citation to some form of
secondary authority. 8 While this percentage is higher than that
discovered in the gay rights area, the category of "secondary
authority" encompasses much more than social science informa-
tion. Therefore, it would be necessary to determine what percentage
of the secondary authorities, analyzed in these other studies, related
to social science. In this context, Bernstein found that 75 07 of the
secondary source citations in his sample were to legal authorities,
such as law reviews, which contain limited social science, and only
popular versions of scholarly findings, and sometimes to the findings
themselves. These do not show up as such in the body of their opinions.
Old habits of citation persist, no doubt, because judges still feel that
only "legal" authorities are legitimate.
Id. at 816-17 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
77. Briefly, a primary authority is the law, either in the form of a case,
statute, or rule. A secondary authority is everything else and can include both
legal and nonlegal sources. See Authority, supra note 25, at 619; Bernstein, supra
note 25, at 56 n.6.
78. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 25, at 56-57 (46% of U.S. Supreme
Court's 1965 cases had some reference to secondary authority); Daniels, supra
note 25, at 5 (47.6% of 1978 U.S. Supreme Court opinions had citations to
secondary authority; earlier cases had even less-22.5% in 1900 and 26.2% in
1940); Friedman et al., supra note 25, at 810-14 (40% of 16 state supreme court
cases decided between 1870 and 1970 cited treatises and encyclopedias and less
than 1% of the 1900-1930, 3.8% of the 1945-1955, and 11.9% of the 1960-1970
opinions cited law reviews); Hafemeister, supra note 25, at 210 (51.3% of a
random sample of U.S. Supreme Court opinions decided between 1975 and 1984
contained citations to secondary source material); Hafemeister & Melton, supra
note 25, at 42 (51.9% of the U.S. Supreme Court's cases from 1975 to 1984 and.
involving children and families referred to at least one secondary source)..
To supplement his quantitative analysis, Bernstein examined the purpose for
which the nonlegal citations were used. He found that the bulk of the secondary
source citations were not authoritative in nature; 48% simply identified discussions
or presented the positions of various persons. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 70.
However, there were 53 citations (14% of the total secondary references) to
secondary authority which were used to support nonlegal fact statements; 27 of
these documented historical statements, leaving 26 which documented something
else. Id. Bernstein emphasizes the paucity of these citations: "In only a minuscule
number of instances was a factual assertion based on writings from other
disciplines." Id. at 80.
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25% were to nonlegal sources, such as social science journals. 79
Thus, the difference between the higher percentages of cases con-
taining all types of secondary authorities found by other researchers
and the percentage of cases utilizing only citations to social science
in the present study can be reconciled. In fact, extrapolating from
these data, cases involving gay persons had a higher overall citation
frequency*
In summary, then, the present study found higher rates of
social science in gay rights cases than in other cases. In fact, the
use of social science in these cases is comparable to its use in other
controversial contexts, such as death penalty decisions. This high
incidence of social science citations in gay rights litigation is
particularly noteworthy because much of this other research on
courts' citation patterns focused on the U.S. Supreme Court, which
has been shown to be a more frequent and sophisticated user of
social science than other courts.80 It was these provocative findings
which motivated the author to further explore the causal factors
or forces which have contributed to the frequent citation of social
science in gay rights cases.
III. AN EXPLORATION OF THREE SYNERGISTIC FORCES CONTRIBUTING TO
THE HIGH RATE OF CITATION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION
IN GAY RIGHTS CASES
A. Introduction
This, Part presents and explores the interactive forces that have
contributed to the high incidence of citations to social science in
gay rights cases. These forces fall into three general categories: (1)
the historical legal context in which such cases are being decided;
(2) the justificatory functions which the citations serve within the
opinions in light of the controversial nature of homosexuality; and
79. Id. at 66. Similarly, Hafemeister found that legal secondary sources
contributed three-quarters of all the secondary source citations. Hafemeister,
supra note 25, at 211.
80. See, e.g., Acker, supra note 71, at 12 ("The lower courts rarely cited
social science materials in the cases that reached the Supreme Court, and made
virtually no contribution to the justices' acquisition or evaluation of the research
evidence.").
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(3) the efforts of gay litigants, and their litigation allies, to provide
social science information to the courts.
8
1
First, this section explores the notion that the high frequency
of social science in gay rights cases is partially attributable to a
modern legal culture in which the citation of social science has
become more routine.82 That is, the courts cited more social science
in the studied cases simply because the cases were relatively recent
and it has become more common over time for courts to use social
science in their opinions.
A second set of forces contributing to the high rate of citation
in gay rights cases is the specific functions, justificatory in one
form or another, which these citations performed within the written
legal opinions. Courts used social science citations for at least four
distinct purposes: (1) to gather and transmit information about
homosexuality; (2) to debunk myths regarding gay individuals; (3)
to apply a scientific veneer to a troublesome and controversial
topic; and (4) to shift difficult decision making responsibility to
social science findings. In addition to these four functions, the
courts received conflicting information from the social sciences
regarding homosexuality and this conflict arguably resulted in a
higher rate of citation.
The third set of forces contributing to heightened social science
citation is the systematic efforts of gay litigants to provide social
science information to the courts. Litigants' dissemination efforts
were complemented by two distinct types of organizational amici:
gay and civil rights groups and scientific associations, such as the
American Psychological Association. Since litigants and amici have
aggressively used social science information, it could be expected
81. Of course, an alternate explanation of the results is that they are simply
an artifact of the study based upon the methodology employed. The study did
not obtain a representative sample of all gay rights cases, but rather, it utilized
representative samples in the four selected substantive areas. Thus, the results
may not be generalizable to the entire population of gay rights cases, but may
merely indicate that these substantive areas have an unusually large number of
social science citations. However, it is important to note that the sampled cases
did in fact comprise a significant percentage of the total population of gay rights
cases; other areas of law involving gay individuals were considerably less devel-
oped.
82. Paul L. Rosen, History and State of the Art of Applied Social Science
Research in the Courts, in THE UsE/NoNusE/MIsusE oF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH
I rEE CoURTs 3 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980), commented:
"[D]uring the past twenty years the relationship between social science and law
has become not only familiar but routinized." Id. at 12.
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that courts are more likely to actually cite that information in
their opinions.
While these are conceptually separate and distinct explanatory
mechanisms, and therefore are considered seriatim, none of them
can fully explain the high incidence of social science in gay rights
cases. Rather, a complete explanation of this phenomenon is only
possible by considering the interactive influence of these three sets
of forces. Thus, for example, gay litigants may feel compelled to
proffer social science findings to debunk prevailing myths about
homosexuality and courts may be more receptive to this infor-
mation because of broadening notions of legitimate authority in
legal citation patterns.
B. The Evolution of Modern Legal Culture and the Increased
Acceptance of Social Science
The first synergistic force militating toward the high rate of
social science citation in gay rights cases is the intellectual context
within which these cases are being decided. The fight for gay rights
in the legal system, which may be dated to the late 1960s or early
1970s,83 coincided almost exactly with changes in the legal system's
acceptance of information from the social sciences.8 4 Because gay
rights cases are of relatively recent origin-most of the studied
cases were decided in the last two decades 85-these opinions could
be expected to contain more social science simply because courts
have become more receptive to social science over time. Three
aspects of modern courts' increased absorption of social science
information merit closer analysis in this context: (1) the heightened
coalescence of law and social science on a jurisprudential level;
(2) judges' increased resort to citations of secondary authority,
83. See Cain, supra note 13, at 1580; see also Richard Delgado, Fact,
Norm, and Standard of Review-The Case of Homosexuality, 10 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 575, 579 (1985).
84. The question of whether this is more than a coincidence is not easily
answered. See Cain, supra note 13, for a discussion of gay rights activists' efforts
to have homosexuality declassified as a mental illness.
85. The median opinion year (i.e., the number which lies at the midpoint
of the cases) for all four samples was 1977 and the range was 1894 to 1987. The
study employed the median because the usual measure of central tendency, the
mean or mathematical average, is too heavily skewed by a few outlying cases.
Breaking the data down by the four substantive areas, the median opinion years
for the CC, ED, FA, and CS samples were 1980, 1975/76, 1979/80, and 1970,
respectively. When the CS cases were excluded, the median opinion year rose to
1979 with a range of 1947 to 1987.
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including social science, in their written legal opinions; and (3)
changes in the rules of evidence which have facilitated the intro-
duction of social science information, particularly expert testimony.
1. The Rapprochement of Law and Social Science on a
Jurisprudential Level
Historical analyses of the interaction of law and social science
indicate that there has been an increasing rapprochement between
the two disciplines. Loh, in his four-part schemata of the inter-
action of law and psychology,8 6 has designated the 1970s and
beyond as the "coming of age" of this exchange.
The 1970s saw an explosive growth in social psychological
research on the judicial process that continues unabated
today. By the start of the 1980s, various institutional de-
velopments seemed to augur the "coming of age" of the
field. These developments included an outpouring of articles
and books, more in a few years than had been published
in the preceding three-quarters of a century ... ; the ap-
pearance of specialized journals (for example, Law and
Psychology Review; Law and Human Behavior); the estab-
lishment of joint-degree training programs and interdisci-
plinary courses and professional societies (for example,
Division 41 on "Psychology and Law" of the American
Psychological Association, which has grown to over 1,000
members within three or four years of its establishment).
8 7
Although the history of the interchange between law and social
science has not been strictly linear,8 in the last two or three
86. Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal Research: Past and Present, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 659 (1981) [hereinafter Psycholegal]. Loh's four stages of development in
the relationship between law and psychology are: (1) the pioneering stage (1900s);
(2) the legal realist stage (1930s); (3) the forensic stage (1950s); and (4) the coming
of age (1970s). See also WALLACE D. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS: CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT 607 (1984) [hereinafter SocIAL RESEARCH].
87. SOCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 86, at 607 (citations omitted); see also
Psycholegal, supra note 86, at 659-60.
88. "A short history of the flirtation between law and [social] science can
be written in terms of oscillation between simplistic optimism followed by chilling
skepticism followed by a decade or so of silence and inaction, with the cycle
then repeating." Harry Kalven, Jr., The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical
Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 58 (Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. ed., 1968). However, Bersoff asserted that this cycle does result in
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decades, jurists have evinced an increased willingness to consider
information provided by the social sciences. Two of the preeminent
authorities in the field, John Monahan and Laurens Walker assert:
Three-quarters of a century have passed since an American
court first invoked social science research to support its
choice of a rule of law. Once heretical, the belief that
empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine
is now one of the few points of general agreement among
jurists. 9
Changes at the jurisprudential level have manifested themselves in
several respects in the actual operation of the legal system.
2. Modern Courts Are More Likely to Cite Social Science Than
Their Predecessors
In addition to the evolution in interdisciplinary collaboration
between law and social science, there has been a change in what
is considered legitimate authority in a written legal opinion. That
some progress in the interaction of the two disciplines. He adopted the term
"spiral of history" to characterize this progression. A "spiral of history" means
a recurrence of older conceptions (i.e., coming full circle) but at more sophisti-
cated and complex levels. Donald N. Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial
System: Broader Perspectives, 10 LAW & HuMAN BEHAV. 151, 151 (1986); see
also Psycholegal, supra note 86, at 625-26 (arguing that the history of the
interaction between law and psychology is "characterized by a succession of
dialectical interchanges").
Some empirical studies have also noted the non-linear nature of the rela-
tionship between law and social science. For instance, Acker, supra note 69,
found that the Supreme Court cited more social science in the 1968-1972 and
1978-1982 terms than in the 1973-1977 and 1983-1987 terms. See also Rosenblum,
supra note 25; Citations, supra note 25.
89. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Eval-
uating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 477
(1986); see also Levine & Howe, supra note 22, for their analysis of the penetration
of social science into legal culture:
Over the past 75 years, social science references in court decisions
have changed from an anonymous footnote to an appendix to a brief
(Muller v. Oregon, 1908) to extensive discussion of social science methods
and results to changing a rule of law based on social science propositions
(Hovey v. Superior Court, 1980).... Although earlier attempts to
introduce social science into law were relatively unsuccessful, there is
now a sufficient acceptance and a sufficient professional infrastructure
to predict a growing influence of social science in law.
Id. at 173.
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is, the heightened interaction between the disciplines of law and
social science has translated into an overall loosening of the
hegemony of primary authority citation in courts' written opinions.
As Merryman noted:
Whether secondary authorities are or are not law depends
on what the courts do with them. If the courts cite them
then they are in some sense law as a result of citation; they
become part of the judicial process.... The conclusion is
that if lav is to be viewed as a legal process, and if
authority is regarded as the published matter that is actually
relied on by a court in its part of that process, then
authority varies in degree but not in kind, and statutes and
cases are more authoritative than other legal and nonlegal
writing, but are no more authority.9°
The general trend has been for courts to broaden the sources
of information9' which inform their decisions and ultimately appear
as citations.92 This trend can be traced from an early increase in
citations to general secondary authority, such as encyclopedias and
annotations, 93 followed by an increased reliance on legal periodicals
90. Authority, supra note 25, at 621.
91. Importantly, social science, in the form of research or general infor-
mation, can be contained in either primary or secondary authorities. For instance,
a court might cite a previous case for a factual proposition which is based upon
social science research, without also citing the research. Thus, there is a recycling
process by which social science information is disseminated in the legal system.
92. Daniels, supra note 25, at 4, found that there was a sharp increase in
the use of secondary source citations by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1900,
1940, and 1978 terms. There were 127 secondary source citations in cases decided
in 1900 (0.651% per case) as compared to-921 citations in 1978 (7.140% per
case.) Nonlegal citations increased from 17 in 1900 to 260 in 1978 (an increase
of 1,429%).
93. See Daniels, supra note 25, at 6-7 (legal treatises, which dominated in
1900, fell noticeably in 1978 and legal finding tools and other research aids-
restatements, encyclopedias, annotation, and others-fell from 7% of total sec-
ondary source citations to 3.2%); Friedman et al., supra note 25, at 811 (decline
in citations to treaties, encyclopedias, restatements, etc. in past 30 years by 16
state supreme courts); Citations, supra note 25, at 405 (from 1950 to 1970,
decrease in citations to Restatements, encyclopedias, and annotations matched
with a sharp increase in citations to legal periodicals by California Supreme
Court). But see Bobinski, supra note 25, at 996 (treatises are still a significant
factor in 1983 cases of N.Y. Court of Appeals).
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or law reviews, 94 and finally, over time, increased reference to
social science sources. 95 In this connection, Melton noted: "Use of
social science was a logical next step for courts. ' 96 Thus, what is
legitimate authority in the context of a written legal opinion has
changed as the overall interaction between the disciplines has
altered.
94. See Bobinski, supra note 25, at 998 (increased use of legal periodicals
between 1963 and 1983 in opinions of the N.Y. Court of Appeals in selected
group of cases); Daniels, supra note 25, at 6 (in 1900, 1940, and 1978 terms of
Supreme Court, legal periodicals accounted for 0.8%, 15.6%, and 37.2%, re-
spectively, of all secondary source citations); Friedman et al., supra note 25, at
812 and Kagan et al., supra note 25, at 991-93 (increase- in law review citations
by 16 SSCs by 1960-70 and by 1940-1970, respectively); Citations, supra note 25,
at 405 (in 1950, 1960, and 1970 California Supreme Court opinions, approximately
20%, 33%, and 50%, respectively, of the total number of citations to secondary
authority were to law reviews); Newland, supra note 25, at 478-80 (slow increase
in Supreme Court's citation of legal periodicals in 1924-1938 and dramatic increase
between 1939 and 1956; 17% of 1939-1943, 28% of 1944-1948, and 26% of 1949-
1953 opinions contained legal periodical citations); Turner, supra note 25, at 499
(slight increase in Kansas Supreme Court's citation of legal periodicals). But see
Sirico & Margulies, supra note 25, at 134 (decrease from 963 citations to legal
periodicals in 1971-1973 to 767 citations in 1981-1983 period by U.S. Supreme
Court). See also Thomas L. Hafemeister, Comparing Law Reviews for Their
Amenability to Articles Addressing Mental Health Issues: How to Disseminate
Law-Related Social Science Research, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 219 (1992) (a
survey of law reviews for social science research on mental health issues);
Hafemeister & Melton, supra note 25 (a survey of law reviews for developmental
research); Maru, supra note 25 (an empirical examination of which law reviews
were cited by other law reviews).
95. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 263 (approximately 20% of 1925-1938
U.S. Supreme Court cases cited non-legal materials as compared to 50% of the
1938-1970 cases); Rosenblum, supra note 25, at 16 (5.8% of U.S. Supreme
Court's 1958 cases cited social science, while 12% of 1974 opinions did). Also,
Acker found:
Both the justices and the brief-writers tended to cite traditional legal
authorities that discussed social science findings instead of referring
directly to social science periodicals and statistical reports. The justices
... did not cite periodicals other than law reviews as social science
authorities until the last five years of the study, the 1978-1982 Terms,
when 21 NonILPs [i.e., journals not in the Index to Legal Periodicals]
(14%) were cited for social science purposes.
Acker, supra note 69, at 31.
96. Gary B. Melton, Bringing Psychology to the Legal System: Opportu-
nities, Obstacles, and Efficacy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 488, 490 (1987); see also
Peter W. Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the
Adversary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280, 284 (1980): "The question is not whether
to rely on scientific knowledge, but when and how."
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3. Changes in the Rules of Evidence Have Facilitated Courts' Use
of Social Science
Finally, shifting conceptualizations of the -appropriate role of
social science within the legal system have also manifested them-
selves in changes in the rules of evidence. Coincidentally, the
Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, the same time
that the gay rights movement was getting under way and courts
were turning with increasing frequency to social science informa-
tion.
While not exhaustive, consideration of two rules of evidence
should suffice to illustrate how the shift in the rules invited more
social science. First, FRE 401, 97 which defines relevant evidence,
was specifically designed to permit "broad admissibility":
The definition in Rule 401 is Thayerian: it includes within
the compass of "relevant evidence" all that is logically
probative. This definition has rightly been termed "gener-
ous," and one whose distinct cast is toward "broad ad-
missibility." . . [T]he Rule requires no more probative
worth than that which reasonable persons would require in
making thoughtful decisions in life outside the courtroom. 98
Second, the adoption of FRE 70299 governing expert testimony,
and the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals'00 interpreting that rule, indicate an inclina-
tion to permit more social science evidence to be admitted. In
discussing whether FRE 702 implicitly incorporated the more re-
97. "'Relevant Evidence' means any evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
Evm. 401.
98. DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
638-39 (Vol. 3 1979); see also JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 34 (1898): "We should have a system of evidence
simple, aiming straight at the substance of justice, not nice or refined in its
details, not too rigid, easily grasped and easily applied."
99. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvM. 702.
100. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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strictive Frye v. United States'0' "general acceptance" standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court wrote:
The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a
rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds
with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their
"general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony." Given the Rules' permissive backdrop
and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony
that does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion
that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.
Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for
admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard,
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. 102
While Daubert concerned one category of social science, expert
testimony, it reinforced the trend toward broad admissibility and
may affect the degree to which all social science is admissible.
Thus, social science may be more prevalent in the final decision
in a case because it is more likely to be admitted at the trial court
level in the first instance.
In summary, then, the changing legal culture regarding social
science's contribution to judicial decision making, as manifested
in citation patterns and rules of evidence, may be partially re-
sponsible for the heightened use of social science in gay rights
cases. This explanation, however, does not completely account for
why gay rights cases use more social science than other cases
embedded in the same time frame. 03 Thus, while gay rights liti-
gation's coincidental arrival on the scene during a period of
101. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the Principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
102. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citation omitted).
103. See supra Part II.B. for a comparison of the use of social science in
gay rights cases with its use in other contexts.
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heightened interest by the legal system in social science is a
necessary part of a causal explanation, it is not a sufficient one.
C. The Justificatory Functions of Social Science Citations in Gay
Rights Cases in Light of The Controversial Nature of Homosexuality
The second major set of forces contributing to the high rate
of social science citations in gay rights cases is the specific functions
that these citations perform in the courts' written opinions. Ob-
viously, it may be expected that judges will cite social science in
gay rights opinions, as in any other type of case, simply as a
necessary component of their decision making process.,04 However,
the unusually large number of gay rights cases containing social
science citations indicates that courts are utilizing this information
for auxiliary purposes beyond those normally associated with ju-
dicial opinion writing. In large measure, the courts are employing
these auxiliary citations (i.e., those not essential to the decision of
the case) as justificatory devices when confronted with what one
court characterized as "the sensitive and polemical issue of ho-
mosexual rights, an issue which has spawned nationwide debate
and attention."' 0 5 Thus, the controversy surrounding homosexu-
ality has directly affected the content of the legal decisions rendered
in this area. '°6
104. For interesting discussions by judges on the use of social science, see,
e.g., J. Braxton Craven, Jr., The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the
Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 150 (1975); George
R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to
Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 39; Henry J.
Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MiMI
L. REV. 21 (1978); Irving R. Kaufman, The Anatomy of Decisionmaking, 53
FoRDHAhi L. REv. 1 (1984); James B. McMillan, Social Science and the District
Court: The Observations of a Journeyman Trial Judge, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157 (1975); John M. Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social
Sciences in the Judicial Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 134 (1975).
105. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 860 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 981 (1978).
106. Legal opinions involving gay persons continue to constitute a highly
polarized and controversial area. The law in this area has been variously described
as "hotly contested," Delgado, supra note 83, at 575, and "fragmented," Rhonda
R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 799, 947 (1979).
Even the language used in gay rights cases signals their controversial nature.
Goldyn, supra note 14, examined 191 state and federal appellate cases decided
after 1950 for gratuitous derogatory remarks about gay litigants, or what he
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While the range of courts' justificatory uses of social science
materials in gay rights cases is potentially unlimited, this section
will focus upon the four most common uses. First, courts are
using social science findings to educate various audiences about
homosexuality and ultimately, in that effort, to persuade them of
the legitimacy of their decisions. Second, courts are utilizing social
science to debunk prevailing myths about homosexuality thus
justifying their departure from anti-gay conceptions. Third, courts
are exploiting the authoritative appeal of "science," in the guise
of social science citations, as a means of desensitizing or even
sanitizing, the troubling moral and political issues associated with
homosexuality. Fourth, courts are using social science as window
dressing'0 7 for decisions reached on other policy grounds, thereby
shifting responsibility for difficult decision making. Finally, the
fact that courts are receiving conflicting information from social
scientists about homosexuality, due in part to its controversial
nature, has also militated toward courts' heightened citation of
social science in these cases.
1. Information Recitation and Transmission: Social Science Used to
Educate Others About Homosexuality
One reason that social science is cited so heavily in gay rights
cases is courts' efforts to educate and persuade other constituencies
about a relatively unknown and not well-understood phenomenon
in our society-homosexuality. Judicial opinions are not written
in a vacuum. As published'08 documents emanating from the legal
system, they are written for the benefit of at least three distinct
audiences: the parties, other members of the judiciary both within
terms "queer baiting." He asserted that the presence of unnecessary negative
comments regarding homosexuality, such as calling gay individuals "perverted"
or describing sodomy as "vile," "disgusting," or "depraved," was indicative of
the legitimacy, or lack thereof, accorded gay litigants. Goldyn found that nearly
one quarter of the cases contained such comments. In addition, Goldyn discovered
that the incidence of gratuitous derogatory remarks fell from the 1950s to the
1970s, and he noted: "The decline in the use of abusive language indicates an
increased willingness on the parts of courts to consider the claims of gay people
in a rational and serious manner." Id. at 41.
107. Rosenblum, supra note 25, at 72.
108. But see Rivera, supra note 106, at 805 ("[T]here is some evidence that
cases involving homosexual issues are unpublished more often than are cases
involving other issues.").
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and outside the court's jurisdiction,' °9 and, finally, members of
the general public. While factual recitation is part of almost any
legal opinion, the recitation and transmission of information about
homosexuality appears to be particularly important due to the
controversy surrounding homosexuality. Also, the relative recency
of gay rights cases and the concomitant dearth of precedent
heightened courts' inclination to recite significant amounts of
information for the guidance of subsequent courts.
First, with respect to the parties, it has been noted that courts
often include in their opinions information supplied by the litigants
simply to show that it had been carefully considered by them in
reaching their ultimate decisions. "They wish to give the losing
parties the impression that the court has considered their argu-
ments-wishes them 'to feel they've had a good run for their
money,' as one judge said."' 10 Thus, the fact that gay litigants
have made extensive efforts to provide available social science to
courts has undoubtedly further inclined courts to include this
information.
Second, in addition to writing for the litigants, courts also
write for other members of the judiciary. Thus, judges write their
opinions to transmit what they have learned about the phenomenon
of homosexuality in order to apprise other courts about relevant
information that might be useful in subsequent cases. Bernstein,
in his study of the U.S. Supreme Court's use of secondary source
citations, noted: "Most of the relevant citations were not made as
justification for conclusionary statements at all, but were simply
explanatory references. These citations appear to be designed to
function as educational devices by apprising readers of the available
literature on problems which come before the Court or on related
questions.""'
109. Marvell, supra note 25, at 116, commented: "As a general rule, the
information mentioned in opinions are factors in the opinion writer's decision,
except to the extent that things are added solely for the benefit of other judges."
See also Miller & Barron, supra note 26, at 1192, for a discussion of the internal
bargaining process at the U.S. Supreme Court.
110. Marvell, supra note 25; at 110. Similarly, Bernstein, supra note 25, at
79, commented: "In addition, the Justices frequently took pains to set out the
views and conclusions of various commentators, including law students, and to
demonstrate that those views had been carefully considered."
111. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 79; see also William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 249 (1976):
The normal function of the scholarly citation is not to adduce authority
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In the sample of studied cases, many of the opinions contained
exhaustive discussions of the social science literatures regarding
various aspects of homosexuality. 1 2 However, one of the most
interesting examples "of a court's efforts to educate on the topic
of homosexuality occurred in the majority opinion in Gaylord v.
Tacoma School District No. 10."1 There, the court cited and
discussed fourteen social science publications and Webster's Dic-
tionary to do nothing more than arrive at a definition of homo-
sexuality. 1 4 The Gaylord dissent was critical of this approach:
"For all the scholarly research done by the majority here, the
most basic point has been missed; the respondent school board
did not meet its burden of proof."'1 5 The Gaylord court's extensive
use of social science citations is slightly reminiscent of the Supreme
Court's decision in Ballew v. Georgia."16 In that case, Justice
Blackmun discussed the relevant social science at some length,
causing commentators to compare his opinion with a social science
article" 7 and triggering a caustic concurrence by Justice Povell.118
While Gaylord is significant for the sheer number of citations
to social science on a very basic proposition-the definition of
for a proposition but to give credit for prior original work, to refer the
reader to corroborative and collateral findings by other scholars, and as
a method of incorporating by reference relevant theorems, proofs,
etc.... [T]he second and third functions of scholarly citation have
counterparts in judicial citation.
Id. at 251.
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), opinion
supplemented, 106 F.R.D. 526, rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
113. 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
114. Id. at 1343-44. Similarly, the court in McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F.
Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), stressed that social science was critical to an
appreciation of homosexuality: "No medical or other expert witnesses were called
by either party to opine on the habits, proclivities, attitudes, and attributes of a
homosexual person. The court is therefore left with but the dictionary definition
of that term." Id. at 812.
115. Gaylord, 559 P.2d at 1348 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
116. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). Ballew concerned the question of whether a five-
member jury in a criminal trial is constitutional.
117. Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow, Mathematics, Social Science,
and the Law, in THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SocIAL RESEARCH IN THE
COURTS 117, 121 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980) ("Those who
are familiar with the case know that Blackmun's opinion reads like a social
science article, citing both empirical and theoretical studies.").
118. "[I] have reservations as to the wisdom-as well as the necessity-of
Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical
studies." Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246.
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homosexuality-other courts took a more straightforward approach
to the dissemination of information about homosexuality. In at
least two cases, the courts self-consciously highlighted social science
information for the educational benefit of other courts. In S. v.
S.,1 9 a child custody case, the court wrote:
We express our appreciation for the research by the
parties into this matter and particularly commend the trial
judge for his independent research. This Court would call
attention to an article entitled "Children of lesbians: their
point of view" contained in the Journal of the National
Association of Social Workers, Vol. 25, Number 3, May,
1980, p. 198, et seq. This article points out the fact that
the lesbianism of the mother, because of the failure of the
community to accept and support such a condition, forces
on the child a need for secrecy and the isolation imposed
by such a secret, thus separating the child from his or her
peers. 2
0
The court's recitation of this acquired social science information
did not go unnoticed by other courts; it reached the very audience
it was intended to inform. Two subsequent cases, from separate
states in different years, quoted directly from this portion of the
opinion regarding the emphasized article.
121
Similarly, in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, '2
the Sixth Circuit also recited information of importance for other
courts: "Careful studies of homosexuality have now established
two facts of which the courts should be aware and should take
judicial notice. The first is that homosexuality is not a mental
disease, like insanity or a psychopathic personality. The second is
the extent of homosexuality in the United States."'
Later in the opinion, the court commented: "In dealing with
this type of case, this court (and others) should be aware and take
judicial notice of the monumental works concerning the incidence
119. 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
120. Id. at 66.
121. See Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)
("[W]e think it appropriate to refer to a recent Kentucky case of S v. S ...
where the facts were similar to the case at bar. . . .") (citation omitted); Constant
A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
122. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
123. Id. at 454.
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of homosexuality in males and. females in the United States.' ' 24
Again, the Sixth Circuit's efforts at information dissemination
were rewarded. When Rowland was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall incorporated the social
science information cited by the Sixth Circuit in their dissent to
the denial of certiorari.125
Because gay rights cases are of relatively recent origin, these
courts faced a heightened need to gather and recite information.
26
Without precedent, courts were more free to do more extensive
investigation about, and exposition upon, the issue of homosexu-
ality. In addition, because the case might have been one of first
impression within the jurisdiction, courts may have felt compelled
to provide information about homosexuality for the benefit of
courts in their wake. Here, it is important to note that courts
often borrow social science from other cases without resort to
citation of the original materials. 27 Thus, in new and novel cases,
124. Id. at 455. The Sixth Circuit also digested the available social science
for the benefit of other courts ("The following sentences represent cumulative
summaries of Kinsey's authoritative works on homosexual incidence ... ") and
signalled them where to locate this information. Id.
125. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 n.7.
126. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
127. In the studied cases, several courts borrowed social science from pre-
vious opinions, even when the court was not invited to do so. For instance, in
Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Mass. 1980), a clinical psychologist
testified that: "[T]here is no evidence at all that sexual preference of adults in
the home has any detrimental impact on children." This testimony was then
quoted in three subsequent cases: M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 968 (Sup.
Ct. 1986); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967 (Okla. 1982); Doe v. Doe, 284
S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981).
Similarly, in N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the
court reviewed testimony from an expert witness who stated that no harm occurred
to the child by being raised by a lesbian mother, yet the court ultimately
discounted this testimony by saying:
Allowing that homosexuality is a permissible life style-an "alternate
life style", as it is termed these days-if voluntarily chosen, yet who
would place a child in a milieu where she may be inclined toward it?
She may thereby be condemned, in one degree or another, to sexual
disorientation, to social ostracism, contempt and unhappiness. Appellant
Kathy stresses Dr. Buchanan's testimony that the child at this time-
age 10-shows no ill effects from her present environment. Dr. Buchanan
finds the child to be normal and well adjusted. The court does not need
to wait, though, till the damage is done. If the child's situation is such
that damage is likely to occur as her sexual awareness develops with the
approach of young womanhood, the court may in a proper case remove
her from the unwholesome environment.
Id. at 186. Subsequently, the court in L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) quoted this entire passage from N.K.M.
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courts may supply the social facts which are used later by other
courts. 128
Finally, the educative function of social science was also ap-
parent in a few cases in which the courts appeared to be speaking
to a larger audience, the general public. 2 9 Marvell comments:
A similar practice is keeping public reaction, especially
press reaction, in mind when wording opinions (as opposed
to when reaching decisions); judges may leave out language
that could lead to attacks, or explain the holding with extra
care so that the press does not misinterpret it. This does
not happen often, though, since the press pays no attention
to the vast bulk of cases decided by courts below the U.S.
Supreme Court level.s 0
While Marvell may be correct that the majority of cases decided
below the Supreme Court go unnoticed by the public, this is
certainly not true with respect to gay rights cases. Rather, these
are exactly the kinds of cases which attract media and public
attention because of their controversial nature.
One of the prime examples of an opinion geared to the general
public was Baker v. Wade,13' which is quoted at the beginning of
this Article. Similarly, in Fricke v. Lynch,'3 2 a case involving the
issue of whether a male high school student could bring another
male to the prom, the court ultimately held that preventing him
from doing so would be a violation of his first amendment rights.
While social science played a very minor role in this case, the
128. One particularly interesting finding reported by Marvell was that at one
court, 1/7 of the social facts in the majority opinions were quotations from a
prior legal opinion. He notes: "Social facts found in opinions very likely have
an aura of authenticity that leads judges to accept them more readily and that
makes them more presentable in opinions." MARVELL, supra note 25, at 184. In
addition, Marvell also discovered that at least one court sometimes used legal
rules as evidence of human behavior. Id.
129. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 70, hypothesized that secondary source
citations in majority opinions appeared to further educate the public, while these
same citations in dissenting opinions appeared to further educate the other
Justices.
130. MARVELL, supra note 25, at 111 (footnote omitted).
131. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1147 (N.D. Tex. 1982), opinion
supplemented, 106 F.R.D. 526, rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
132. 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
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court's self-justificatory language at the conclusion of its opinion
is noteworthy:
As a final note, I would add that the social problems
presented by homosexuality are emotionally charged; com-
munity norms are in flux, and the psychiatric profession
itself is divided in its attitude towards homosexuality. This
Court's role, of course, is not to mandate social norms or
impose its own view of acceptable behavior. It is instead,
to interpret and apply the Constitution as best it can. The
Constitution is not self-explanatory, and answers to knotty
problems are inevitably inexact. All that an individual judge
can do is to apply the legal precedents as accurately and
as honestly as he can, uninfluenced by personal predilec-
tions or the fear of community reaction, hoping each time
to disprove the legal maxim that "hard cases make bad
law. '' 1
33
Thus, from the foregoing analysis, courts cite social science
information in excess of what normally would be expected in order
to educate their various audiences about the issue of homosexuality,
thereby justifying their decisions. These educational efforts are
particularly important because of the controversial nature of ho-
mosexuality; the same types of explanatory devices would be
unnecessary in cases involving more settled issues.
2. The Substantive Impact of the Information: Social Science Used
to Debunk Prevailing Myths and Stereotypes About Homosexuality
In addition to using citations as a mechanism to transmit
information to others, courts used social science citations for a
more particularized and substantive purpose-namely, to debunk
133. Id. at 389 (emphasis added); see also Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day
Comm., Inc. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 541 F.
Supp. 569, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub. nom., Hill v. United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The fact that
some American citizens find homosexuality morally repugnant, or the purposes
of the Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day events abhorrent or offensive, cannot provide
an important governmental interest upon which an impairment to First Amend-
ment freedoms can be based."); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987) ("This court cannot take into consideration the unpopularity of
homosexuals in society when its duty is to facilitate and guard a fundamental
parent-child relationship.").
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common and pervasive myths about homosexuality. The prevalence
of homophobia13 4 and stereotypical conceptions of homosexuality
within society as a whole, and within the legal system in particular,
have been well-documented.' 35 Recognizing the existence of myth-
ical notions of homosexuality, gay litigants have made extraordi-
nary efforts to provide information to the courts countering these
myths. In the same way, courts frequently incorporate social
science information in their opinions to disabuse their readers of
myths regarding homosexuality.
Each of the substantive contexts contained cases in which the
court used social science to demystify prevailing notions of ho-
mosexuality. One of the clearest examples of this was a child
custody case, M.A.B. v. R.B. 31 There, the court explicitly ac-
knowledged the existence of misconceptions about homosexuality:
One commentator has recently outlined the reasons why
homosexual parents are denied custody. "The reasons given
boil down to a few arguments: if gay parents have custody,
they will molest the children; ... they will turn the children
into homosexuals; ... they will perform sex acts in front
134. For definitions of homophobia, see Mark F. Kohler, Comment, History,
Homosexuals, and Homophobia: The Judicial Intolerance of Bowers v. Hardwick,
19 CONN. L. REv. 129, 130 (1986) ("Homophobia is an irrational fear of and
intolerance toward homosexuals and homosexuality."); Robert B. Mison, Com-
ment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient
Provocation, 80 CAL. L. Rnv. 133, 147-48 (1992) (footnote omitted) ('homo-
phobia' refers to a hatred of gay men and lesbians rather than a clinical fear of
homosexuals. It should be understood as a 'prejudice, comparable to racism and
anti-semitism, rather than an irrational fear similar to claustrophobia or agora-
phobia."'); see also Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the
Legitimatization of Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 829 (1987) (discussing
evolution of homophobia); Gregory M. Herek, The Social Psychology of Ho-
mophobia: Toward a Practical Theory, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 923,
925 (1986) (arguing that the better term is heterosexism); Nancy D. Polikoff,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J.
459, 547-48 (1990) (distinguishing between homophobia and heterosexism).
For psychological treatments of homophobia, see Gregory M. Herek, Beyond
"Homophobia". A Social Psychological Perspective on Attitudes Toward Les-
bians and Gay Men, 10 J. HOMOSExuALrrY 1 (1984); Gregory M. Herek, Attitudes
Toward Lesbians and Gay Men: A Factor-Analytic Study, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALrrY
39 (1984).
135. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: The Gay Rights
Biggest Roadblock, 5 Crv. LiBERTmS REv. 19 (1979); Goldyn, supra note 14.
136. M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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of the children; .. . the children will be harmed because
of the immoral environment."13 7
The MA.B. court then went on to consider expert testimony that
the homosexuality of a parent does not adversely affect his or her
children. 3 8 Similarly, in Bezio v. Patenaude,13 9 the court relied on
"[u]ncontroverted expert testimony ... to the effect that a parent's
sexual preference per se is irrelevant to a consideration of that
parent's ability to provide necessary love, care, and attention to a
child. ' 140 Courts also cited social science to contradict stereotypical
notions of homosexuality in employment discrimination, First
Amendment, and criminal sodomy cases. For instance, several of
the studied opinions, including High Tech Gays,'4' Rowland,
42
and Baker, 43 used social science to counteract one of the most
popular myths about homosexuality-that it is the result of mental
illness.
Several aspects of the data in the present study also substan-
tiated the courts' use of social science to debunk prevailing myths.
First, the commonality of these myths across substantive areas
apparently contributed to the high incidence of citations to social
science in all case contexts. As Rivera noted: "The common
denominator in these cases is that sexual orientation of the indi-
vidual involved has become dispositive of the outcome of the legal
dispute.' 4 Thus, once homosexuality is raised in any context, the
137. Id. at 964-65 (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 968-69.
139. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
140. Id. at 1211; see also Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (being raised by a homosexual parent does not increase the likelihood
that child will become homosexual); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d
886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (sexual preference is developed at an early age).
141. "For years the uncontroverted consensus of the American professional
psychological community has been that homosexual orientation itself is not a
psychological problem." High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
668 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. The dissenting judge in Rowland wrote: "My colleague's opinion seems
to me to treat this case, sub silentio, as if it involved only a single person and
a sick one at that-in short, that plaintiff's admission of homosexual status was
sufficient in itself to justify her termination. To the contrary, this record does
not disclose that she is subject to mental illness; nor is she alone." Rowland v.
Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
143. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1129-30.
144. Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
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use of social science to debunk myths concerning it becomes a
threshold requirement before any other issue can be addressed.
The present study's finding that the four substantive areas did not
differ significantly in terms of the numbers of citations to social
science bears out this point.
Second, it is also significant that the cases adopting a nexus
analysis had four times as many citations and references to social
science as those cases which did not. Courts adopting a nexus
approach to gay rights cases used social science to debunk myths
in order to arrive at decisions based less upon stereotypical con-
ceptions of homosexuality and more upon the particular factual
situation at issue. On the other hand, courts focusing exclusively
on the issue of homosexuality per se ignored or downplayed the
available social science.
On a more general level, the courts' use of social science
citations to debunk prevailing myths in gay rights opinions may
also demonstrate the inherent tension between courts' intuitive
notions of human behavior145-often referred to as fireside
inductions"4-and social science information. 47 Since a sizable
portion of the social science used in the sampled opinions was
essentially counterintuitive, courts may have deemed it important
to substantiate their decisions by citing the supporting social sci-
ence. If the information had been intuitively obvious, the same
type of documentation may not have been necessary. The impor-
tance of citing social science information when it contradicts
common notions of human behavior is not unique to gay rights
Eighties-Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 459, 461 (1985). As some commentators
have noted, judges often act upon their preconceived notions of homosexuality
rather than the facts in any particular case. See, e.g., Donna Hitchens & Barbara
Price, Trial Strategy in Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert
Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 451, 451 (1978-79).
145. See, e.g., Sperlich, supra note 96, at 281 (judges prefer to rely on
common knowledge or personal experience rather than science).
146. Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of
a Clinical Psychologist, in LAw, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 10,
10 (June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
147. Elsewhere, the author has argued that courts err when they rely upon
their own intuitive assumptions about lesbian mothers rather than obtaining
empirical data. See Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: Psychosocial Assumptions
in Family Law, 44 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 941 (1989); Patricia J. Falk, The Gap
Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical Research in Lesbian-Mother
Child Custody Cases, in REDEFINING FAMmsEs: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S
DEVELOPMENT (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994).
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cases. In fact, it has been argued that social science is at its best
when it does exactly that. 1
48
While the use of social science information to debunk myths
about homosexuality was quite common in the sampled cases,
some courts rejected this counter-mythical information outright,
possibly because of judicial homophobia or the triumph of intuitive
notions of human behavior over empirical reality. One of the
clearest examples of this sort of rejection occurred in a child
custody/visitation case: 149 "The experts' testimony with respect to
molestation of minors is likewise suspect. Every trial judge, or for
that matter, every appellate judge, knows that the molestation of
minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the psychological
experts' testimony indicated."' 50 Thus, social science usage often
depended upon the success of the litigants in persuading the courts
themselves that existing myths about homosexuality were indeed
false.
148. There are many examples of the uses of counterintuitive information
from the social sciences outside the gay rights context. For instance, in State v.
Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash. 1992), the court considered the admissibility of
expert testimony on battered child syndrome. The court ultimately permitted the
testimony, stating:
The testimony offered by the appellant's experts and a review of
the materials cited by the appellant illustrate just how counterintuitive
and difficult to understand the dynamics of the relationship between a
batterer and his victim can be .... The impact of long-term abuse on
a child's emotional and psychological responses is a matter that is thus
beyond the average juror's understanding.
Id. at 1243.
Similarly, in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court held that
a jury instruction regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony was neces-
sary: "To guide trial courts, we note that a proper instruction should sensitize
the jury to the factors that empirical research have shown to be of importance
in determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially those that
laypersons most likely would not appreciate." Id. at 492. But see Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986): "The evidence [that death-qualification makes a
jury more conviction-prone] thus confirms, and is itself corroborated by, the
more intuitive judgments of scholars and of so many of the participants in capital
trials-judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors." Id. at 188. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Also, FED. R. Evim. 702 allows expert testimony when it will "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Thus,
social science information may come in to allow judges to make better decisions
in areas in which they are ignorant or in which intuitive notions do not satisfac-
torily explain the behavior.
149. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
150. Id. at 869.
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3. The Authoritative Nature of the Information: Social Science Used
to Apply a Scientific Veneer'
5'
A third auxiliary function which citations to social science
performed within gay rights opinions was that courts cited this
information to invoke the authority of science to support their
conclusions. Thus, in addition to the substantive impact of the
social science, the form of the information had considerable appeal
as well. The fact that information came from empirical studies
and expert testimony helped to make the court's decision more
palatable than if the judge had simply asserted that she no longer
believed that homosexuality was a mental illness. The courts used
the social science to lend an air of scientific certainty or objectivity
to a troubling and controversial issue.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that there were a
number of courts in the sampled opinions that cited various
professional, mental health, and quasi-medical organizations for
the proposition that homosexuality per se is no longer considered
a mental disease or disorder. One of the best examples of this
strategy comes from the Baker case: "Indeed, homosexuality is
not a 'disease' and is not, in and of itself, a mental disorder.
Although society-and courts-may still grapple with this question,
in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed homosex-
uality from its list of psychic disorders. 152 The Baker court seemed
to be saying that although some of us may still disagree about the
status of homosexuality as a mental illness, that issue has been
firmly settled by the relevant scientific community.
Another example of the use of authoritative sources in the
scientific community as persuasive ammunition in gay rights cases
concerned the use of citations to the Surgeon General's position
on homosexuality.'53 In Rowland, 15 4 for instance, the court quoted
151. "Sometimes the law's reference to science may merely provide a veneer
of scientific determinism to decisions that really turn on policy considerations to
which the scientific referent bears little relation." Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact,
and Science in the Courts, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 1080, 1098 (1966).
152. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1129-30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
153. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1375:
In Hill, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Public Health Service
recognized that 'current and generally accepted canons of medical prac-
tice' do not consider homosexuality per se to be a psychiatric disorder.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Surgeon General in making
this determination relied on the professional expertise of recognized
medical organizations including the American Psychiatric Association,
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from the Surgeon General's report that homosexuality is no longer
classified as a mental disease or defect. 55 The court called the
Surgeon General's memo an "authoritative statement of modern
medical opinion concerning homosexuality." 56 In the same way,
the opinion in Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day'5 7 emphasized the Sur-
geon General's report and noted that it was partially based on the
authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American
Psychiatric Association. 58 As these examples demonstrate, courts
may employ social science as a means of avoiding or defusing the
moral and ethical issues often inherent in gay rights decisions by
infusing the opinions with an appearance of scientific objectivity.
The gambit of applying a veneer of science to an otherwise
controversial decision is certainly well-documented outside the gay
rights context as well as within it. As Lochner put it: "Dressing
up an opinion with the language of social science in order to lend
legitimacy to an otherwise questionable result may make the de-
cision more palatable to the public or the legal profession.' ' 59 The
Supreme Court's opinions in two abortion cases, Roe v. Wade'16
and, more recently, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, ' 6' are instructive in this regard. The invocation
of science adds to the overall persuasiveness and unassailability of
the opinion; it imbues rational decision making with medical
certainty and support. 62
In an interesting twist on the phenomenon of shoring up an
opinion with social science, several courts cast the issues in these
cases as essentially empirical ones and found the absence of
the American Psychological Association, the American Public Health
Association, the American Nurses' Association, and the Counsel of
Advanced Practitioners in Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of the
American Nurses' Association.
Id. (citations omitted).
154. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 454.
155. Id. at 454 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 455 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
157. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day, 541 F. Supp. at 572.
158. Id. at 572-73.
159. Lochner, supra note 23, at 835-36 (footnote omitted).
160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Laurence H. Tribe, Lecture,
Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Psuedo-Scientific
Sieve, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 155, 168 (1984) ("In its opinion [in Roe], the Court
stressed the role of medical expertise.").
161. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
162. Tribe, supra note 160, at 168, describes this as an "illusion" of
"inexorability."
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scientific findings dispositive of the outcome. For instance, in Doe
v. Doe,163 the court wrote: "The petitioners introduced no evidence,
scientific or otherwise, to establish this fact. Regardless of how
offensive we may find Jane's life-style, its effect on her son's
welfare is not a matter of which we can take judicial notice."'
4
Similarly, in Bezio,165 the court wrote: "In the total absence of
evidence suggesting a correlation between the mother's homosex-
uality and her fitness as a parent, we believe the judge's finding
that a lesbian household would adversely affect the children to be
without basis in the record. This is not a matter about which the
judge could take judicial notice."' 166
Not surprisingly, several of the courts in the studied cases
rejected attempts to approach the issue of homosexuality from a
scientific or empirical perspective. In one of the most scathing
critiques of expert witness testimony found in the present study,
the court in L. v. D.167 wrote: "This evidence of the realities of
appellant's life-style demonstrates that the testimony of her expert
witnesses dealt with abstractions. It also strips the scientific liter-
ature of its facade of statistics and in its application to this case
reduces it to nonsense."'' 61 Similarly, the court in J.L.P.(H.) v.
D. J.P. ,169 in rejecting the expert testimony of two psychologists
regarding the lack of harm to a child from associating with his
homosexual father, stated: "In considering this record, it must be
understood that the psychologists did not testify to scientific facts
generally accepted in the scientific community. They were espousing
only their opinions upon theories of causation, which they both
163. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
164. Id. at 805.
165. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
166. Id. at 1216; see also Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. for City of
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting)
(commenting that the defendants have failed to demonstrate that homosexuality
causes harm to society and cited a law review article "for discussion on the lack
of empirical data on adverse effect of homosexuals on the social system."), aff'd
425 U.S. 901 (1976); People v. Onofre, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (N.Y. App. Div.)
("There are those who urge that homosexual conduct should be proscribed
because even when conducted in private by consenting adults it is destructive of
traditional principles of family and marriage. However, there is no empirical
evidence to support that view."), aff'd 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 (1981).
167. 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
168. Id. at 244.
169. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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admitted were not subject to any demonstrable scientific proof.' 70
Later in the opinion, the court quoted the following:
"In reality, scientific evidence does not by the mere
appellation of the term acquire absolute verity but, like
other evidence, it depends on qualitative factors which
themselves tend to lend greater or lesser credence to the
proof. In short, the scientific evidence depends on the
methodology employed to obtain it and the skills of those
who possess or claim to possess some expertise in the
subject, all of which must be shown as essential to the
proof.' 171
It is hardly coincidental that the opinions in L. v. D. and J.L.P.(H.)
were ultimately decided against the gay litigant. In fact, the ma-
jority of the scientific evidence tends to favor gay individuals and
thus, the courts seeking a contrary result must discount or minimize
the impact of this information. 172
4. Shifting Responsibility for Decision Making: Social Science Used
to Ornament a Decision
73
A final, and perhaps the most unsatisfactory, justificatory use
of social science citations in gay rights cases was to shift respon-
sibility for difficult decision making onto authorities outside the
legal system. It may be far easier for courts to deny gay individuals
various rights if support for those decisions are mandated by an
170. Id. at 868.
171. Id. (quoting B.S.H. v. J.J.H., 613 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981));
see also supra text accompanying note 2 (quoting S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d
164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
172. This strategy seems comparable to that employed by Justice Rehnquist
in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986), where he systematically
picked apart fifteen social science studies regarding the guilt-proneness of death-
qualified juries although there was no evidence to the contrary. The existence of
social science findings made it necessary for the Court to at least discuss them,
although they were ultimately discounted. See Donald N. Bersoff, Social Science
Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
52 (1987). In the same way, courts in the gay rights context had to grapple with
scientific information which might have been contrary to their desired result.
173. Writing about the Supreme Court's decision in Ballew, Loh commented:
"The data were apparently used to ornament a decision reached on other legal
and policy grounds." Psycholegal, supra note 86, at 694-95.
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expert witness or other sources of social science information. 74
Or, alternately, it may be easier for a court to reach a politically
loaded decision in favor of a gay litigant if it is armed with social
science information.
'75
The stratagem of using social science to ornament a decision
which is reached on other grounds in not unique to gay rights
cases. In fact, it is particularly common in controversial areas such
as segregation and abortion. To return to two examples used at
the beginning of this Article, Brown'76 and Roe7 7 have been
severely criticized for their reliance upon scientific sources rather
than confronting the more difficult legal principles upon which
they ought to have been grounded. With respect to Brown, Lochner
has argued:
Frequently, however, social science evidence is used sim-
ply as a make-weight argument, to lend credibility to the
result reached by the court on other grounds. Brown v.
Board of Education is an example of this technique. To
reach the conclusion that segregation was constitutionally
unlawful, the court need not have mentioned social science
research at all, since a long and carefully developed line of
cases had moved away from the doctrine that Plessy v.
Ferguson had established at the turn of the century. None
of these cases had required the use of social science data,
nor need Brown have done so.'
78
174. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 911 (1981).
175. See, e.g., Baker, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1129-31. As discussed below, the
fact that many courts received conflicting testimony regarding homosexuality
exacerbated this problem. Since judges in these cases had a broad range of expert
opinions from which to choose, they might have been tempted to decide based
upon their own value system and recite the social science as a post-hoc ration-
alization. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
176. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by, 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
177. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. Lochner, supra note 23, at 835, (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Wisdom,
supra note 104, at 142, pointed out that the information was relegated to a
footnote. For an interesting discussion of homophobia in the Bowers decision
and a comparison to Plessy, see Kohler, supra note 134. For a provocative
analogy between gay rights and miscegenation see Polikoff, supra note 134:
Courts and legislatures have previously seized on discriminatory ideol-
ogies disguised as scientific truth to serve as the basis for judicial and
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Writing about the decision in Roe, Tribe reached the same
conclusion:
Indeed, the Court's elaborately medical trimesterization
of pregnancy in Roe v. Wade involves the same kind of
abdication to expertise. The Court says that the state does
not have a compelling interest in protecting the fetus until
it is "viable," and it defines "viable" in medical terms-
i.e., in terms of capacity to survive in an incubator outside
the woman's uterus. Why precisely does the magic moment
of compelling interest occur just at viability and not before
or after? The Court offers only this "reason": Because,
after viability, the fetus can survive in a hospital, outside
the uterus.
That's a definition, not a reason. But it's easier to offer
a definition; to point to the medical profession and its
consensus; in effect, to blame "science" for a definition
and a decision which, if defensible (and I believe it was,
although it's hardly an easy one), was defensible only
because it helped to empowerl women in society by putting
them on a more equal footing with men. Men don't have
to be involuntary incubators, even for their own children.
If Roe v. Wade was right, that's why it was right-not
because of what doctors think or what medical science
describes '79
Similarly, social science in gay rights cases might serve as a
justification for legal decisions reached on other grounds.
There were a few cases in the studied opinions which eschewed
social science and rested their decisions squarely on the legal
doctrines involved. Interestingly, most of these come in the first
statutory activism in the area of child rearing. ...
As recently as 1966, Virginia argued in support of its antimiscegen-
ation law that "It]he available scientific materials are sufficient to
support the validity of the [antimiscegenation] statute." The State quoted
from various medical, scientific, and psychological experts to assert that
interracial marriage posed a threat to the children's "welfare and to the
welfare of society as well" ....
It is now easy to recognize that the antimiscegenation laws were
grounded in racist ideology, not scientific principles.
Id. at 545-47 (footnotes omitted).
179. Tribe, supra note 160, at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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amendment context. For instance, in Gay Lib v. University of
Missouri,180 the court stated that even accepting the testimony of
the experts at face value, it was insufficient evidence to justify a
prior restraint.18' In Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan,1 2 the court
held that expert testimony used in Gay Lib was irrelevant to the
First Amendment issue, and was equally irrelevant in its own
case.8 3 And finally, in Aumiller v. University of Delaware,8 4 the
court wrote that it would decline to consider expert testimony on
the etiology of homosexuality and its psychological implications.' 5
While some of courts' uses of social science seem laudable,
such as to debunk mythical images of homosexuality, the citation
of social science to adorn an opinion reached on other grounds is
troublesome because it obfuscates the underlying legal issue. When
courts consider the issue of gay rights from a purely empirical
perspective, they can avoid confronting the more difficult legal
questions of whether homosexuality is protected under a right to
privacy or equal protection analysis.8 6 Thus, when courts cite
social science as the primary justification for their decisions, they
divert attention from the fact that gay rights need not turn on
180. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978).
181. Id. at 854.
182. 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978).
183. Id. at 955 n.6.
184. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
185. Id. at 1290-91.
186. Justice Blackmun articulated a right to privacy analysis in his Bowers
dissent:
"[Tihe concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs
to himself and not others nor to society as a whole." . . . The Court
recognized ... that the "ability independently to define one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a
vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties
with others."
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human experience, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality." The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant
way through their intimate sexual relationships suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will
come from the freedom of an individual to choose the form and nature
of these intensely personal bonds.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1986) (citations omitted). For a
possible equal protection argument see Rowland, 730 F.2d 444.
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discrete empirical questions, but on whether gay individuals should
have the same protections that other members of society enjoy.
5. Conflicting Information from the Social Sciences Regarding
Homosexuality
A fifth reason for the relatively high incidence of citations to
social science in gay rights cases is the fact that courts received
conflicting information17 from social scientists regarding homosex-
uality. 8 Cases in all four substantive contexts involved "battles
of the experts"' 8 9 on such diverse questions as: (1) whether being
187. It is important to note in this connection that empirical social science
is available on many of the issues litigated in gay rights cases. Thus, unlike some
areas of the law in which courts cannot resort to social science because it does
not exist, this is one context in which the dearth of information is not a threshold
problem. But see Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 8 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) ("The testimony of the psychiatrist and the studies she cited are unpersuasive
as they are of limited number and of recent origin and have not withstood the
test of time.").
188. The mental health community continues to be divided on the issue of
homosexuality although this disagreement seems to be abating. Slovenko provides
this excerpt:
Dr. Jon K. Meyer commented, "At the moment, homosexuality is
perhaps the most difficult subject in psychiatry to address. Few condi-
tions affecting the psyche and behavior have been so intensely scruti-
nized, debated, and politicized. Conceptualization of homosexuality-as
a life-style, a preference, an illness, a socio-political movement, a bio-
logical predisposition-is marked by a fundamental lack of consensus."
Ralph Slovenko, Foreword: The Homosexual and Society: A Historical
Perspective, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 445, 450 (1985).
The fact that there is not total consensus among social scientists regarding
homosexuality is not unusual in disciplines full of divergent viewpoints. However,
the existence of inconsistent opinions within the social sciences has led to some
resistance on the part of jurists to use social science information. Fahr points
out that the social sciences often lack the unanimity attorneys expect in turning
to specialized fields of knowledge: "IT]he state of uncertainty, doubt, and
disagreement among social scientists themselves gives the lawyer reason to doubt
and to reject what has been done as so speculative as to be dangerous to use
unless meticulously safeguarded by familiar processes." Samuel M. Fahr, Why
Lawyers are Dissatisfied with the Social Sciences, 1 WAsInuai L.J. 161, 175
(1961); see also Lochner, supra note 23; Miller & Barron, supra note 26; Rosen,
supra note 82.
189. Most of the battles of experts did not occur over adjudicative facts
(the facts of the particular case, e.g., whether Ms. Jones is a good parent), but
rather over legislative facts (more broad-ranging facts, e.g., whether all lesbian
women make good parents). For a fuller discussion of the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts, see Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAxv. L. REv. 364 (1942).
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raised by a homosexual parent has a detrimental affect on chil-
dren;190 (2) whether having a gay teacher would affect the sexual
identity of his students;191 (3) whether recognizing a gay student
organization would increase the incidence of sodomy; 92 and (4)
whether homosexuality is a mental illness within the context of
decriminalizing sodomy. 93 This conflict within the social sciences
may have engendered higher citation rates in several ways.
First, legal decision makers, faced with conflicting reports by
"authorities," may have felt obliged to present all the information
either to allow reviewing courts to understand the dilemmas faced
by them or simply to highlight the fact that even the "experts"
did not agree on this issue. 94 Thus, the fact that social scientists
presented differing views of homosexuality may have fueled the
fire of controversy and arguably led to higher rates of citation
than in less controversial fields.
An additional reason that conflicting testimony among experts
regarding homosexuality may lead to higher rates of citation than
would normally be expected is that courts were unable to evaluate
the information and therefore included it all. 95 In many of the
190. See, e.g., Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981), L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
191. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 847-49 (D.
Md. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
192. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir.
1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); see also Gay Alliance of
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 n.3 (4th Cir. 1976) (parties stipulated,
inter alia, that "medical authority is divided on the question of whether an
opportunity to join and identify with a group such as the one proposed encourages
people to make a homosexual identification who otherwise would not do so.").
193. See, e.g., Baker, 553 F. Supp. at I129-32.
194. See, e.g., Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 847 (the theoretical determinants
of homosexuality are still substantially a matter of controversy); Fricke v. Lynch,
491 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D.R.I. 1980) (psychiatric profession is divided on the
issue of homosexuality).
195. Several commentators have noted the inability of courts to properly
evaluate information froin the social sciences. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Igno-
rance of Science is No Excuse, TRiA., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18; David L. Suggs,
The Use of Psychological Research by the Judiciary: Do the Courts Adequately
Assess the Validity of the Research?, 3 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 135 (1979). Monahan
& Walker propose four criteria for evaluating social science: (1) surviving the
critical review of the scientific community; (2) employing valid research methods;
(3) generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) supported by a body of other
research. Monahan & Walker, supra note 89, at 499. Monahan and Walker's
suggestion may have the effect of lessening the amount of social science which
1994]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
opinions, legal decision makers were unable to reconcile the varying
reports provided by social science experts or authorities, often
reaching inconsistent and highly polarized conclusions.'9 One court
apparently used a split-the-difference approach in assessing the
appears in judicial opinions:
[W]e believe that if courts treat social science research as social authority,
fewer judicial opinions will rely upon social science material, but the
material that is used will be of much higher quality. Poor studies will
be screened out, and exemplary research will become more apparent. In
this way, the development of fair and efficient rules of law that rely in
part upon empirical propositions will be facilitated.
Monahan & Walker, supra note 89, at 516-17; see also Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceutical, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), which gives federal district court judges
much discretion and a heavy burden in having to evaluate information from
other disciplines.
196. Compare the approaches taken by two courts with respect to conflicting
expert testimony in the child custody context. In L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244-
45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the court rejected the testimony of a social psychologist
and a clinical psychologist to the effect that a lesbian mother is not harmful to
her child in favor of a clinical psychologist presented by the husband with
apparently little expertise regarding homosexuality: "Appellant contends this
psychologist was not qualified because he stated that he had only average
familiarity with scientific literature relating to homosexuality. His answer has
reference to average familiarity for a psychologist." Id. at 243. In Doe v. Doe,
452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), the trial court heard the testimony of
four psychiatrists, three of whom opined that there was no adverse influence as
the result of having a lesbian mother.
The fourth psychiatrist testified that mere association between a minor
child and a homosexual parent was detrimental to the child. The trial
judge, however, found that this witness's opinion was not credible
because "he had no supporting studies and his exposure to single parent
lesbians was limited." Moreover, the witness "never articulated good
reasons for his opinion."
Id. at 296 n.2.
In Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 860 (8th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978), the majority and dissenting opinions
came to very different conclusions regarding conflicting expert testimony at trial.
In reversing the district court's decision, the majority opinion discounted two of
the experts whose testimony was apparently relied upon by the court below:
"Defendants urge that their experts are more worthy of belief because of their
outstanding professional credentials. We need not pause here since defendants'
evidence turns solely on Dr. Voth's conclusory 'inference' and Dr. Socarides'
'belief,' for which no historical or empirical basis is disclosed." Id. at 854. One
dissenting judge, wishing to uphold the district court's findings, stated: "Lacking
training in the psychiatric discipline, appellate judges are ill-prepared to conclude
that these expert psychiatric opinions lack an historical or empirical basis." Id.
at 860. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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social science. 197 One notable exception to this trend was the court
in Baker,198 which did an excellent job of evaluating the conflicting
expert testimony. 199
The general inability of courts to evaluate social science, 20° and
particularly conflicting social science, may have caused them to
present more information than necessary to decide the case. In
more settled fields, courts may be more adept at sorting out the
"good" from the "bad" social science and referring only to that
197. In Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 847-49, the court heard testimony from
two experts who claimed that having a gay teacher might affect children's sexual
orientation and three experts who stated that sexual identity was determined early
in life. The court also received into evidence a number of publications which
contained the same type of conflicting information. Noting the impressive cre-
dentials of one expert, the court nevertheless held that it would be "premature
to state definitively that Acanfora's presence in the classroom will have no
deleterious effect." Id. at 849. The court said that it could not ignore the danger
noted by the other experts: "The danger does not seem as great or as likely as
defendants have assumed, but it is not illusory." Id.
198. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1121.
199. The Baker opinion is remarkable for the extensive and detailed discus-
sion of homosexuality and social science it contains. More than four full pages
are devoted to an analysis of the expert evidence. The court weighed the testimony
of a psychiatrist, Judd Marmor, and a sociologist, William Simon, against the
testimony of another psychiatrist, James Grigson. The court noted that Marmor
and Simon were experts in the field of homosexuality and determined that the
testimony of Grigson was inferior:
This Court completely discounts Dr. Grigson's testimony and his
opinions. These opinions are not based upon any independent research
or supported by "any respected medical or psychiatric literature."
... Moreover, Dr. Grigson's opinions were directly contrary to
those of plaintiff's experts-whose qualifications as experts in the field
of homosexuality were outstanding and whose testimony was very cred-
ible-and to positions adopted by various medical and psychiatric as-
sociations.
Id. at 1131-32 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Baker court not only discussed social science in considerable detail,
but assessed the credibility of competing expert witnesses by reference to other
social science sources such as professional organizations and publications. This
case, perhaps more than any other in the entire gay opinion sample demonstrated
considerable sophistication with respect to the use and evaluation of social science.
It also illustrated a criterion suggested by Monahan and Walker in evaluating
social science, namely consensual support for a particular social science propo-
sition. Monahan & Walker, supra note 89, at 499.
200. In the present study, the ratings for degree of detail and degree of
reliance also indicated that the courts neither discussed the social science infor-
mation to any substantial degree nor relied heavily upon the information which
they cited. Rather, the courts tended merely to recite the social science, without
substantive comment or attempt to appraise its value.
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information which has been evaluated as worthy of inclusion. 20 1
Finally, the conflict in the social science evidence may have
had the collateral consequence of allowing the court to render a
decision on other grounds, because it was supported by at least
one side of the conflicting social science. Wasby emphasized the
importance of this problem vis-a-vis legal decision makers: "Judges
will use social science findings when they reaffirm the judges'
positions. In this regard, we ought to be well aware of Don
Horowitz's point that competing social science findings provide
judges with the flexibility to do what they want to do. ' 20 2 Similarly,
Rivera asserts: "Experts are relied upon, not based on the level
of their knowledge, but based on how closely their prejudices
conform to those held by the court.
'20 3
201. Of course, some of this "conflict" in the social sciences appears to be
manufactured. In some cases, the court received a relatively one-sided presentation
of information, but chose to characterize the information as less certain than
was really the case. See, e.g., J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App.
Ct. 1982), in which the court remained skeptical of certain expert psychological
testimony despite any evidence to the contrary. Id. at 868-69.
For a similar case not contained in the present study, see Opinion of the
Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987), where the dissent wrote:
The legislature received no meaningful evidence to show that ho-
mosexual parents endanger their children's development of sexual pref-
erence, gender role identity, or general physical or psychological health
any more than heterosexual parents. The legislature received no such
evidence because apparently the overwhelming weight of professional
study on the subject concludes that no difference in psychological or
psychosexual development can be discerned between children raised by
heterosexual parents and children raised by homosexual parents.
Id. at 28 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Even the same social science has been used by opposing sides to make their
arguments. A prime example of this phenomenon is the research on the imposition
of the death penalty on juveniles. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988), Justice Stevens used Professor Victor Streib's research to argue against
the imposition of the juvenile death penalty. Id. Justice Scalia used the same
research in his dissent to argue for its imposition. Id. The social science was
used similarly in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), a subsequent juvenile
death penalty decision.
202. Stephen L. Wasby, History and State of the Art of Applied Social
Research in the Courts, in THE UsE/NONUSE/MIsusE oF APPLIED SociAL RESEARCH
IN THE COURTS 16 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980) (citations
omitted). This criticism of the social sciences is similar to one author's assertion
that it is possible to write a Brandeis brief for almost any proposition. Edmond
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 154 (1955). See also Arnold M.
Rose, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness, 40 MINN. L. REv. 205 (1956).
203. Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties-Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 354 (1986).
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In summary, the controversial nature of homosexuality con-
tributes to the increased citation of social science in gay rights
cases largely because courts feel compelled to justify their decisions
to a greater extent than in less troublesome areas. These justifi-
catory strategies take a number of forms, including educating
others, like the public, about homosexuality in general or, more
particularly, debunking mythical notions regarding gay individuals.
There was also evidence that courts deployed more sophisticated
means of justification, such as invoking the cover of science or
shifting the burden of decision making onto non-legal "authori-
ties," like social scientists. These strategies were aided, in part, by
the availability of divergent viewpoints among social scientists
regarding homosexuality. These reasons largely explain the courts'
use of social science information, but one additional factor must
be considered: the extensive efforts of gay litigants and organiza-
tional amici to provide courts with this information.
D. Litigants and Amici are Inundating the Courts with Social Science
Information in Gay Rights Cases
While the legal climate must be hospitable to the introduction
of social science and courts inclined to recite this information for
justificatory purposes, social science must still come to the courts'
attention in the first instance. One of the primary mechanisms
through which courts obtain social science is its presentation by
the parties or amici.204 Thus, the third synergistic force contributing
to the heightened citation of social science in gay rights cases is
the cumulative impact of efforts by three separate contingents-
individual litigants, gay and civil rights groups, and scientific and
professional organizations-to provide social science to the courts
deciding these cases. 20 5
204. At the trial court level, the litigants may introduce expert testimony or
submit Brandeis-brief materials. At the appellate court level, social science in-
formation is usually provided through briefs by the parties or amici. See Elizabeth
D. Tanke & Tony J. Tanke, Getting Off a Slippery Slope: Social Science in the
Judicial Process, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1130, 1136-38 (1979) (discussing various
methods of introducing social science information).
205. Courts also obtain social science through independent research. Rosen-
blum found that some of the sources of social science used by the court and not
cited by the parties were well-known works in the area. "It is plausible to
interpret these data to support the proposition that citations at the Court's own
initiative are frequently post hoc efforts by Justices or clerks to find whatever
support might be available to bolster the position taken." Rosenblum, supra note
25, at 72. Some commentators have criticized the use of independent research by
the court as being at variance with the adversary process. See, e.g., Miller &
Barron, supra note 26, at 1189-90.
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In the sample of studied cases, it was difficult to precisely
gauge the actual contribution of litigants and amici since most of
the opinions did not disclose the sources of the information
included within them. 206 However, a few of the sampled cases
demonstrated that concerted dissemination efforts had an effect
on the court's citation of social science. In S. v. S., the court
thanked the parties for providing relevant social science research.
207
In S.E.G. v. R.A.G., the court acknowledged that one of the
parties and the American Civil Liberties Union had provided
considerable social science evidence. 208 Finally, dissenting in Bowers
v. Hardwick,2°9 Justice Blackmun cited directly from an amicus
curiae brief filed by two professional associations.
210
Outside the context of gay rights cases, there is evidence that
dissemination efforts by litigants and others encourage the citation
of social science information by courts. Several researchers have
compared the exposition of social science in the briefs of the
parties or amici with the citation of this information in the resulting
judicial opinions and found a considerable degree of correspon-
dence.
2 1
206. As one author wrote about her own study, but with equal applicability
here:
In general, however, this study suffers from the limitations inherent
in virtually exclusive reliance upon judicial opinions. Chief among these
limitations is the inability to determine the extent to which judges relying
upon social science literature did so as a result of independent research
or as a result of Brandeis briefs.
Davis, supra note 46, at 1547 n.35.
207. 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981).
208. 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
209. 478 U.S. 186 (1985).
210. "Despite historical views of homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by
mental health professionals as a 'disease' or disorder. See Brief for American
Psychological Association and American Public Health Association as Amici
Curiae 8-11." Id. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Acker, supra note 71, at 11 (47.3% of social science citations
came from the briefs in 1958-1987 U.S. Supreme Court criminal cases); Acker,
supra note 69, at 30, 35 (47.3%, 30.6%, and 25% of social science sources were
also in the briefs in a sample of U.S. Supreme Court criminal, exclusionary rule,
and jury cases, respectively); Acker, supra note 12, at 436 (56.5% of social
science references had been previously cited in the briefs in 1963-1985 U.S.
Supreme Court death penalty cases); Acker, supra note 75, at 80 (67.9% of the
social science references in 1986-1989 U.S. Supreme Court death penalty decisions
came from the briefs).
See also Bernstein, supra note 25, at 71 (60% of the sources of empirical
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In addition to these empirical studies, several commentators
have remarked on the interactive effects of attorney and judicial
behavior in the use of social science information. As courts use
social science more frequently, attorneys are more likely to turn
to social science sources and provide that information to the
courts. 21 2 Complementarily, as attorneys use social science more
often, courts are also more likely to use the proffered information
in their opinions. 2 3 Thus, while there is not a simple isomorphic
relationship between the litigants' introduction of social science
information and the court's citation of that information in its
opinion,2 4 it can be expected that systematic and sustained efforts
to provide courts with social science will ultimately affect the
content of the legal decisions rendered.
data in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1965 majority opinions were in the briefs);
Marvell, supra note 25, at 192 (1/3 of the references to publications containing
empirical data were also cited in the briefs; 60% of the social facts supported
by empirical data came from the record or the briefs); Rosenblum, supra note
25, at 68 (1/3 of the social science references in a sample of Supreme Court
cases had been cited in the briefs); Turner, supra note 25, at 498 (40% of the
legal periodicals cited in the opinions of the Kansas Supreme Court were in the
briefs).
212. "Repeated uses of social science evidence in particular fields of law
may over time create expectations among attorneys that-as a matter of course-
social science data will be used in resolving legal issues." Lochner, supra note
23, at 824. "Moreover, when judges cite social science research or other scholarly
work, lawyers are encouraged to introduce social science evidence in litigation,
and to use social science sources in arguments in legal briefs." Levine & Howe,
supra note 22, at 174.
213. Rosenblum found that "the more frequently a social science finding
was cited in the briefs the greater was its chance of utilization by the Court."
Rosenblum, supra note 25, at 66. "The more the parties relied on the social
sciences and the more often they repeated citations to them, the more likely it
was that the Court would use the materials." Id. at 69.
Similarly, Baron noted the educative role that attorneys play in using social
science:
In addition, having lawyers write briefs and offer evidence using
these materials seems to me to be the best way to educate judges. Of
course, there are other ways as well-judicial conferences on subjects
of this sort and so forth-but for the most part I think that the job of
a practicing lawyer is that of an educator.
Charles H. Baron, Overcoming Barriers to the Use of Applied Social Research
in the Courts, in THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE oF APPLIED SocIAL RESEARCH IN
COURTS 154, 155 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980).
214. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) is a good example of the
introduction of considerable social science to the court and a resulting opinion
which was essentially devoid of that social science.
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1. Individual Gay Litigants are Making Concerted Efforts To Provide
Social Science to Courts
Undoubtedly encouraged by extensive commentary, gay liti-
gants have made the introduction of social science information an
integral part of the overall litigation strategy in gay rights cases, 215
especially those involving child custody.2 6 As discussed above,
litigants may feel compelled to provide social science information
to courts in gay rights cases either to overcome judicial
homophobia 21 7 or to counter existing myths about homosexuality. 218
Individual litigants and their attorneys are assisted in their
efforts to provide social science to courts in gay rights cases in
several ways. First, social science has become more readily acces-
215. Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian
Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 Bumr. L. REv. 691, 727 (1976);
Hitchens & Price, supra note 144, at 461-71; Rivera, supra note 203, at 330.
216. Whatever the sexual orientation of the parents, custody disputes
often involve the testimony of social workers, psychiatrists, or other
experts to assess the relative merits of the parents. When one parent is
gay, however, that parent must present additional expert testimony of
a general nature to refute stereotypes about homosexuality. Such testi-
mony is particularly important in custody proceedings, because the
stereotypes under attack often bear directly on the domestic life and
child-rearing and lead many to conclude that gay people make poor or
even dangerous parents .... Unless the misconceptions are dispelled
through expert testimony, gay parents are bound to suffer unequal
treatment before a judge who harbors stereotypical views and has the
discretion to act upon them. (emphasis added).
Robert G. Bagnall, et. al., Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 497, 537 (1984).
See also Rivera, supra note 203, at 370 ("The main task of litigators on
behalf of their gay clients in custody cases has been to educate the court. The
myths and stereotypes surrounding gay persons have pervaded the bench as well
as the public."); Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 215, at 727 ("The expert witnesses
for the lesbian mother may well form the most important part of her case.")
This trial strategy may have been at work in the studied cases since the one
difference among the four substantive areas was the higher number of individual
references to experts in the CC sample compared to the other three samples.
217. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 135, at 26 (suggesting that attorneys
conduct "sensitivity training" to combat judicial homophobia and that they
"make the courtroom the forum for science, not superstition or preconception.")
218. See, e.g., Bagnall et al., supra note 216, at 497 ("When a gay person's
sexual orientation is an issue in litigation, there is a need to address squarely
popular misconceptions about homosexuality. Otherwise, judges and jurors, who
are as susceptible to these misconceptions as the public, may discriminate in their
decision-making.").
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sible to lawyers trying these cases because: (1) social scientists have
published more of their research in law reviews and other legal
journals2 9 and (2) the computerization of information sources has
permitted lawyers to have direct access to social science journals. 220
Second, litigants and their attorneys are being directly and
indirectly supported in their efforts to obtain and present relevant
219. The message is clear. If social scientists wish their work to reach
legal commentators, they must learn to "think like lawyers" and write
for a legal audience, or at least to collaborate with scholars who are
skilled in legal analysis. Without an integration of the findings with
legal questions, even very relevant research is unlikely to be noticed by
its intended audience.
Hafemeister & Melton, supra note 25, at 54; see also Melton, supra note 96, at
493; Geoffrey W. Peters, Overcoming Barriers to the Use of Social Research in
the Courts, in THE UsE/NoNUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SociAL RESEARCH IN THE
COURTS 158, 161 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980); Tanke &
Tanke, supra note 204, at 1136; Charles R. Tremper, The High Road to the
Bench: Presenting Research Findings in Appellate Briefs, in REFORMING THE LAW:
IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 199, 225 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987).
It has also been suggested that social scientists publish their research in practical
or practitioner-oriented journals. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 96, at 493; Peters,
supra, at 168.
Legal materials regarding gay rights issues may also be more readily available.
The Standing Committee on Lesbian and Gay Issues of the American Association
of Law Libraries has begun publishing a selective bibliography on homosexuality
and the law and "[a]t the 1987 annual convention of the [AALL], the membership
passed a resolution urging libraries to acquire legal materials on the role of
lesbian and gay people in society." Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Selective
Bibliography on Homosexuality and the Law, 1969-1993, 86 LAW LMR. J. 1, 1
(1994).
220. See Acker, supra note 75, at 80:
Although it still may benefit social scientists to publish the results
of their research in legal periodicals and books to attract the attention
of lawyers and judges ... , this practice no longer appears to be as
important as it once may have been. Computerized data bases and other
bibliographic indexing systems have made primary social science refer-
ences widely accessible to law-trained library users.
Id.
Daniels, supra note 25, at 27-28:
In addition, legal researchers today can have easy and immediate
(if not inexpensive) access to a large number of statistical and other
information databases in a wide variety of disciplines. As this body of
easily accessible data grows, the types and amounts of nonlegal sources
cited by lawyers and judges inevitably will expand accordingly. Although
the debate undoubtedly will continue to rage about the propriety and
desirability of using such sources, it is difficult to believe that the
practice will soon abate.
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social science information by various organizations. For instance,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights has published a Lesbian
Mother Litigation Manua 2 ' which includes not only a discussion
of the legal standards and strategic advice, but also considerable
social science information. 222 This manual has been widely dissem-
inated. "[O]ver 500 copies of the manual are in circulation and
on hundreds of library shelves. It is cited in countless opinions
and law review articles and accompanies lawyers to court whenever
there is a lesbian or gay parent to be defended. ' 223 In addition to
their direct participation through amicus briefs, organizations like
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (Lambda)224 and the
American Psychological Association (APA)25 also provide mate-
rials, including relevant social science research, 226 to individual gay
litigants. 2
27
221. LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL (National Center for Lesbian
Rights, 2d ed. 1990).
222. The LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 221, contains a
sample direct examination of an expert witness regarding development of sexual
identity, a "[b]ibliography of psychological and legal materials on lesbian and
gay parenting," and three amicus briefs heavily laden with social science. One
of the amicus briefs concerns "Adverse Impact and Nexus Argument," the
second is entitled "Lesbian Custody: Disarming the Myths and Stereotypes," and
the third relates to visitation restrictions.
223. LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 221, at preface.
224. Interview with Evan Wolfson, Lambda (May 19, 1994).
225. The APA, based in Washington, D.C., makes briefs filed in gay rights
cases available to the public. In addition, the APA disseminates an annotated
bibliography and copies of recent research papers. Interview with Clinton An-
derson, APA (May 17, 1994).
226. Similarly, in the context of 1963-1985 death penalty cases, Acker found
that the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. played a significant
role in infusing the parties' briefs with social science. James R. Acker, Seed to
Root to Branch: Briefwriters' Contributions to Supreme Court Capital Punish-
ment Doctrine, 17 Cnuim. JusT. REv. 20, 27 (1992).
227. The fact that litigants, supported by various organizations, are providing
social science to courts in gay rights cases has some interesting implications for
the dissemination efforts of social scientists. Instead of targeting the courts,
social scientists could target certain litigant populations, such as gay individuals,
for indirect dissemination efforts. See Tanke & Tanke, supra note 204, at 1136:
"A second avenue for presentation of research to the courts is through the parties
themselves. Parties may be willing to use social science research in support of
their arguments but may be unaware of its existence." Thus, by providing plain
label or generic briefs, publishing more of the existing amicus briefs, or furnishing
copies of available studies to litigants, social scientists may affect the final content
of judicial opinions in this area without participating directly in the cases. See,
e.g., Ronald Roesch, et. al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus
Curiae Briefs, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1991); Michael J. Saks, Improving
APA Science Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 235 (1993).
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2. The Participation of Gay and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici
Curiae
While individual litigants and their attorneys have made re-
markable efforts to provide social science to courts, these efforts
may have been outstripped by the contributions of two distinct
types of organizations that have filed amicus curiae briefs in gay
rights cases: (1) organizations devoted to advocating for gay and
civil rights and (2) professional scientific associations unconnected
with the gay rights movement per se but possessing expertise in
the relevant social science.
The gay rights movement has spawned not only a plethora of
organizations devoted exclusively to the advancement of the inter-
ests of gay individuals, such as Lambda, 228 but has also resulted
in the co-option of portions of other more broadly-based groups,
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).229 While no
empirical data exist regarding the extent of their participation, it
appears that these organizations have been heavily involved as
amici in gay rights litigation throughout the country. 230 The par-
228. See Cain, supra note 13, at 1584-87. Lambda was started in 1973. An
earlier organization, the National Gay Rights Advocates (NGRA) is now extinct.
229. The ACLU officially recognized the principle of gay rights in 1966. In
1973, the ACLU created the Sexual Privacy Project to fight discrimination against
gay individuals. In 1984, the ACLU instituted the Gay and Lesbian Rights
Project. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF
Ti= ACLU 312-13 (1990). For interesting discussions of the evolution of the
ACLU's participation in gay rights cases, see Vern L. Bullough, Lesbianism,
Homosexuality, and the American Civil Liberties Union, 13 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
23 (1986); Cain, supra note 13, at 1583-84.
230. See THE LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund,
New York, N.Y.), a quarterly newsletter, for discussions of its ongoing litigation
efforts. With respect to the ACLU, one of its brochures asserts: "The ACLU
has represented lesbian and gay parents, or filed friend of court briefs on their
behalf, in custody and visitation cases throughout the U.S." American Civil
Liberties Union, Lesbian and Gay Rights Project. Another ACLU brochure
claims: "With the [Lesbian and Gay Rights/AIDS] Project's guidance, the ACLU
handles more legal work in behalf of lesbians and gay men and people with
HIV/AIDS than any other organization in the country." American Civil Liberties
Union, Friends: The Leadership Support Group of the ACLU's Lesbian and Gay
Rights/Aids Project.
Also, many of the studied cases revealed the participation of various types
of amici, including Lambda and the ACLU. In the CC sample, see S.E.G. v.
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (ACLU as amicus); Bezio v.
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (Civil Liberties Union of Mass. and
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders as amici); Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d
130 (Wash. 1978) (ACLU as attorney); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1
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ticipation of special interest amici in ground-breaking and contro-
versial contexts is hardly unique to gay rights cases. In fact, there
appears to be a long history of such participation:
Meltsner credited the legal arguments the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
made in briefs presented in death penalty cases for a
favorable decision in the Furman v. Georgia case that
suspended executions in the United States. O'Connor and
Epstein found that the amicus briefs filed by organizations
promoting the interests of women, labor, and conservatives
contributed significantly to achieving those interest groups'
objectives. Similar successes have been reported for amicus
participation by organizations representing Blacks and
members of fundamentalist religions. 231
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Women's Law Project, Office of Clinical Education of
University of Pennsylvania Law School, American Civil Liberties Foundation,
American Friends Service Committee, and Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task
Force as amici-according to LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note
221). In the ED sample, see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 U.S.
1009 (1985) and High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990) (NGRA as amici). In the FA sample, see Alaska Gay Coalition
v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978) (ACLU as amicus); Childers v. Dallas
Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (ACLU as attorney); Lesbian/
Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub. nom., Hill v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (Gay Rights
Advocates as attorney); Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles Judicial Dist.,
599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979) (National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties (NCSCL)
as amicus). In the CS sample, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (198 )
(Lesbian Rights Project, NGRA, APA, American Public Health Association, and
many others as amici); People v. Baldwin, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974) (ACLU as
amicus); People v. Onofre, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd 415 N.E.2d
936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (NCSCL as amicus); People
v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (Special Committee on Sex and Law of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, NCSCL, New York Civil
Liberties Union, and Lambda as amici).
231. Charles R. Tremper, Organized Psychology's Efforts to Influence Ju-
dicial Policy-Making, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 496, 496 (1987) (citations omitted).
Similarly, Acker noted: "All in all, the brief writers in the death penalty cases
did an exceptional job of apprising the justices about social science information
relevant to case issues; the unusual contributions of briefs authored from the
Legal Defense Fund in this regard cannot be denied." Acker, supra note 12, at
436 (citations omitted).
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A common litigation strategy employed by various amici is the
utilization of social science information in their briefs. For in-
stance, empirical research has shown that amicus briefs use more
social science than the parties' briefs232 and also that much of the
social science cited by courts has come from the amici rather than
the parties. 233 One explanation for these findings is that while the
parties must focus on the specific facts of the case, amici have
more latitude to present broader types of factual information, such
as social science. Similarly, in the gay rights context, there is
evidence that gay and civil rights organizations have made extensive
reference to the available social science information in their amicus
briefs.24 Furthermore, it might be expected that their successive
participation as amici will result in these organizations developing
greater expertise in social science information. 235
3. The Participation of Scientific and Professional Associations,
Such as the APA, as Amici Curiae
Finally, a number of scientific, professional, and medical
organizations 236 have contributed to the tide of social science
232. Rosenblum, supra note 25, at 69; Acker, supra note 69, at 30-31.
However, Acker cautions:
The amici's contributions to the Supreme Court's use of social
science materials thus do not appear to be either as unique or substantial
as might be expected from the generally greater citation and discussion
of social science authorities that occurred in their briefs. This in part
may be because the amicus briefs were prepared on behalf of organi-
zations or entities with little apparent expertise in scientific methods or
subject matter.
Id. at 33. But see Acker, supra note 226, at 25-26 (finding an equivalent amount
of social science in the parties' and amici's briefs in 1963-1985 U.S. Supreme
Court death penalty cases).
233. Marvell, supra note 25, at 192 (50% of the empirical data found in
briefs and ultimately cited by the courts came from amicus briefs rather than
the parties' briefs); Rosenblum, supra note 25, at 68-69 (43% of social science
ultimately contained in the courts' opinions had been presented in amicus briefs).
234. See, e.g., LEsBAN MOTHER LirIGATION MANUAL, supra note 221 (con-
taining two briefs prepared by Lambda and one brief prepared by the Women's
Law Project and others).
235. In the context of death penalty cases, Acker notes the efforts of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund:
This is a dramatic demonstration of the contribution that organi-
zations can make in helping to call social science authorities to the
Court's attention, a contribution that is no doubt facilitated by a
combination of the expertise of the briefwriters and the experience and
sense of continuity that are gained as organizations participate in a
series of cases that share common issues.
Acker, supra note 226, at 27.
236. For instance, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Public
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information provided to courts in gay rights cases. The partici-
pation of this group of amici is noteworthy in two respects. First,
their motivation for submitting briefs is slightly different than
either gay litigants or civil rights organizations. Gay litigants,
seeking to win their particular case, and civil rights groups, wishing
to advance the cause of gay rights, use social science instrumentally
to achieve their litigation objectives. On the other hand, scientific
organizations appear to be primarily motivated by the desire to
inform courts of relevant scientific information and, secondarily,
by the normative goal of achieving greater equality for gay indi-
viduals. 2 7 Melton emphasizes the importance of these dual missions
with respect to psychology:
With the openness of some courts to consideration of
such issues, the potential social consequences of their de-
cisions, and the availability of a relevant body of psycho-
logical research, the social responsibility of psychology to
bring its knowledge to the legal system is clear.
This duty is heightened by the fact that psychology and
the other mental health disciplines historically have con-
tributed to societal prejudice against lesbians and gay men.
2
1
8
The participation of scientific organizations as amici in gay
rights cases is also noteworthy because of their expertise in the
social sciences. 23 9 That is, the dissemination of relevant social
science research and theory is peculiarly within the province of
Health Association, and the National Association of Social Workers have filed
amicus briefs.
237. "The relationship between the social sciences and the lesbian and gay
male civil rights movement'has been a close one." Stephen F. Morin & Esther
D. Rothblum, Removing the Stigma: Fifteen Years of Progress, 46 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 947, 947 (1991).
238. Gary B. Melton, Public Policy and Private Prejudice: Psychology and
Law on Gay Rights, 44 Amd. PSYCHOLoGIsT 933, 934-35 (1989) (citation omitted);
see also Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When A
Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L.
Rnv. 852, 859 n.36 (1985): "Recognizing the impact of modern research, the
American Psychological Association has encouraged mental health professionals
to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been
associated with homosexuality."
239. "Professional social science associations are a natural source for the
neutral expertise the Court needs to assess competing social science claims."
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 153 (1993); see also
Tanke & Tanke, supra note 204, at 1137 (advocating the use of amicus, briefs to
provide social science information to the courts.)
[Vol. 41:1
GAY RIGHTS
these organizations. Acker, noting the dearth of briefs filed by
scientific organizations in criminal cases decided by the U.S. Su-
preme Court,24° stressed the importance of the participation of
these organizations:
The handful of amicus briefs submitted on behalf of
scientifically competent organizations in the sample of ran-
domly selected cases were laden with discussion of social
science materials. They demonstrate dramatically that such
organizations can make an important contribution to the
transmission of social science information to the justices,
and that social scientists need not serve only as after-the-
fact critics of the Court's opinions. 241
Thus, the appearance of scientific organizations as amici in gay
rights cases increases the probability that courts will receive relevant
social science information.
Since an exhaustive discussion of the contributions of all
scientific organizations participating in gay rights cases is beyond
the scope of this Article, the following discussion will focus on
one such organization-the American Psychological Association
(APA).242 Beginning in 1984, the APA has filed amicus briefs in
eight cases involving gay rights. 243 In 1985, the APA also "estab-
240. After discussing the high incidence of social-science in briefs prepared
by scientific amici, Acker comments: "These figures reflect the substantial po-
tential that organizations with scientifically skilled memberships have for trans-
mitting social science information to the justices through preparing and submitting
amicus curiae briefs. The relative dearth of briefs prepared by scientifically
competent organizations, however, also suggests that this potential is being vastly
underutilized." Acker, supra note 69, at 34.
241. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
242. Interestingly, Rustad & Koenig, supra note 239, at 153, n.307 did a
LEXIS computer search of amicus briefs filed by various -organizations in all
U.S. Supreme Court cases from September 1979 to May 1993. They located
numerous briefs by the APA, one brief by the American Sociological Association,
and none by either the American Political Science Association or the American
Economic Association.
243. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (in conjunction with the
APHA); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (in conjunction with the
American Psychiatric Association and the APHA); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881
F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Watkins v. United
States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990);
Stover v. Georgia, 350 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. 1986) (in conjunction with The Institute
for Advanced Study of Human Sexuality, the American College of Sexologists,
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lished the Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian and Gay
Issues, a major focus of which is research for amicus briefs in
civil rights cases involving gay defendants and plaintiffs.''244 In
addition to APA's direct dissemination efforts as amici, it has also
contributed to the promulgation of social science information
through indirect means. 245
APA's participation as an amicus in gay rights litigation has
not been without detractors both within and without organized
psychology. For instance, Posner disparages the content of APA's
Society for the Scientific Study of Sex, and others; Kentucky v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (1992) (in conjunction with Kentucky Psychological Association,
Kentucky Psychiatric Association, Kentucky Chapter of the NASW, and Kentucky
Society for Clinical Social Workers); Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (1994)
(in conjunction with the NASW and Texas Chapter of the NASW); Bottoms v.
Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (in conjunction with American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the NASW, and. Virginia Chapter
of the NASW).
244. Susoeff, supra note 238, at 859 n.36 (citation omitted).
245. First, some of the briefs have been used in other cases with APA's
permission. For instance, in Bowers, the defendant attached the APA-APHA-
American Psychiatric Association Supreme Court brief from Uplinger to his own
appellate brief in the Eleventh Circuit case. A new brief was prepared by APA
and APHA for the Supreme Court case. Second, at least one of the briefs has
been published, see Melton, supra note 238, at 935-40 for the APA brief in
Watkins. Others have been summarized in articles. See Donald N. Bersoff &
David W. Ogden, APA Amicus Curiae Briefs: Furthering Lesbian and Gay Male
Civil Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 950 (1991) (discussing the first four cases and
a fifth case, Stover, which involved a heterosexual man's alleged violation of the
Georgia sodomy statute); Tori de Angelis, Kentucky High Court Repeals Sodomy
Law, 23 AM. PsycHoL. Ass'N MoNrrOR 1 (1992) (discussing the APA brief in
Wasson). According to de Angelis, the brief made three points:
One elaborates on the right-to-privacy issue from a psychological
standpoint, stating that homosexual intimacy doesn't hurt others and is
necessary for gays' psychological health .... In its second point, the
brief states that both social-science research and opinion support the
courts' contention that the Kentucky statute violates Mr. Wasson's right
to equal protection .... In its third point, the brief points out that the
Kentucky law banning sodomy stymies public-health efforts to combat
AIDS, and harms gay men's mental health.
Id. at 2. Third, as noted above, the APA makes these briefs available to interested
parties. Therefore, copies of these briefs may be submitted to various courts
without the APA's direct participation. Information from the APA also reaches
the court by a number. of very indirect and circuitous routes. For instance, in
one child custody case, an expert wrote to the judge and emphasized that he
agreed with the APA's recommendation that sexual orientation should not be
the sole or primary consideration in deciding custody. Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d
799, 803 (Va. 1981).
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brief in Bowers.24" Similarly, Cameron and Cameron assert that
the APA misled the U.S. Supreme Court in its presentation of
some of the research in Bowers.247 While there has only been a
modicum of criticism of the APA's participation in gay rights
cases, there has been considerable discussion of the APA's briefs
in other areas and some of the issues raised in those contexts have
equal applicability to the gay rights area.
24
1
246. RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346 (1992):
But to see the Georgia statute in this light one must know something
about the history of homosexuality and of attempts to repress it; and
on the evidence of the briefs and opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick, what
lawyers and judges mainly know is their own prejudices plus what is
contained in judicial opinions. It is true that the American Psychological
Association and the American Public Health Association filed an amicus
curiae brief in Hardwick that contains many pertinent data on oral and
anal sex, both heterosexual and homosexual, and on homosexuality
generally. But it is full of sappy statements-or so at least they would
seem to the justices-such as "oral-genital sex leads to better and happier
relationships," and it pretends that homosexuals and their relationships
are just like heterosexuals and their relationships.
247. Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Did the American Psychological
Association Misrepresent Scientific Material to the US Supreme Court?, 63
PSYCHOL. REP. 255, 269 (1988): "Ostensibly, an association of psychologists
should perform according to its standards when attempting to influence public
policy. The American Psychological Association does not appear to have fulfilled
this obligation in its amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court." However,
Cameron's position on homosexuality has been the subject of considerable
controversy. According to one news report:
In 1984, the American Psychological Association cancelled Paul
Cameron's membership for violating its ethical principles. The same
year, the Nebraska Psychological Association adopted a resolution dis-
associating itself from Dr. Cameron's writings and public statements on
sexuality.
In 1985, the American Sociological Association said "Dr. Cameron
has consistently misinterpreted sociological research on sexuality, ho-
mosexuality and lesbianism." A judge in Texas referred to "evidence"
provided by Cameron as an "expert" as fraudulent misrepresentation.
Lauten's Sources Lack Credibility, VAN COUVER SUN, Nov. 15, 1994, at A12. But
see Paul Cameron & Mark Pietrzyk, I am Not a Sham, 211 THE NEW REPUBLIC
6 (Oct. 312, 1994).
248. Thomas Grisso & Michael J. Saks, Psychology's Influence on Consti-
tutional Interpretation: A Comment on How to Succeed, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
205 (1991) argues that the APA should write amicus briefs to inform the courts
of relevant information about human behavior, not to advance their own policy
and value preferences: "Psychology's true power, and its most important con-
tribution to society, lies in its science, not in its interpretation of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 210. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 239, for a discussion
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In summary, the cumulative dissemination efforts of gay liti-
gants, civil rights organizations, and scientific associations have
ensured that courts deciding gay rights cases have at their disposal
a wide variety of social science information. However, there are
at least two reasons why this cannot be the sole explanation for
the heightened citation of social science by these courts. First, as
the data above indicate, information provided by litigants and
amici form only a part of the total social science which is cited
in these cases. Courts obtain additional social science through
independent research, including "finding" it in prior cases. Second,
the mere presentation of social science information does not guar-
antee that courts will ultimately include this information in their
opinions or that all of the available information will be utilized.
Thus, it is still necessary to consider the specific purposes for
which the information is cited as well as the historical context of
these decisions.
of selective distortion in amicus briefs.
For a debate regarding the APA's brief in Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162 (1986),
see Rogers Elliott, Social Science Data and the APA: The Lockhart Brief as a
Case in Point, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 59 (1991), Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell
What We Know or Wait for Godot?, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 77 (1991), Rogers
Elliot, Response to Ellsworth, 15 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 91 (1991); see also
Bersoff, supra note 172; Samuel R. Gross, Overruled: Jury Neutrality in Capital
Cases, 21 STANFORD LAW. 11 (1986); In the Supreme Court of the United States:
Lockhart v. McCree-Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychological As-
sociation, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 59 (1987).
For competing views on the APA's brief in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836 (1990), see Gail S. Goodman, et. al., The Best Evidence Produces the Best
Law, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 244 (1992); Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wake-
field, Comment, Poor Psychology Produces Poor Law, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
233 (1992).
For a discussion of the APA's brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989), see Gerald V. Barrett & Scott B. Morris, The American
Psychological Association's Amicus Curiae Brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins:
The Values of Science Versus the Values of the Law, 17 LAW & Hum. BEHAV.
201 (1993); Susan T. Fiske, et. al., What Constitutes a Scientific Review?: A
Majority Retort to Barrett and Morris, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 217 (1993); Jane
Goodman, Evaluating Psychological Expertise on Questions of Social Fact: The
Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1993); Saks,
supra note 227.
For opposing views on the APA's briefs in Thornburgh v. American College
of Gynecologists and Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and Hartigan v. Zbaraz,
484 U.S. 171 (1987) (two adolescent abortion cases), see William Gardner, et.
al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal
Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895 (1989); Gary B. Melton, Comment, Knowing
What We Do Know: APA and Adolescent Abortion, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1171
(1990).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The extensive and broad-ranging litigation efforts of gay in-
dividuals and organizations to impel revolutionary legal change
are likely to continue until the United States Supreme Court
recognizes some form of civil rights for gay citizens. In the
interstitial legal skirmishes, fought in state and lower federal courts
across the country, 249 gay litigants will continue to wield social
science as a weapon, and at least some courts will continue to rely
on this information as justificatory ammunition in their opinions.
In the absence of supportive legal doctrine, factual issues, illumi-
nated by social science information, assume paramount impor-
tance.
In some senses, the utilization of social science in the gay
rights context is most closely akin to the ongoing debate about
the death penalty. Since the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused
to declare the death penalty unconstitutional per se, litigants have
resorted to collateral attacks on capital punishment, e.g., its dis-
criminatory application, aided by the available social science. The
social science information keeps bubbling up in different contexts
because the most direct avenue of legal change has been closed.
The same analysis can be used for gay rights cases. Since no
overarching doctrinal shift has occurred, it could be expected that
social science will keep coming to the fore to promote change.
In the final analysis, social science information may affect the
legal position of gay individuals in a more circuitous fashion, by
influencing public opinion about homosexuality. If social science has
an ameliorative effect on public opinion regarding gay individuals,20
249. Gay rights advocates can also take their message to the legislatures.
"[C]ourts are not the only means for redressing grievances. Lesbian and gay
male citizens have the right to petition their state and federal governments for
laws protecting intimate sexual behavior or for repeal of current laws." Bersoff
& Ogden, supra note 245, at 955.
250. The APA has "sponsored research and public education programs to
help dispel anti-gay stereotypes" Susoeff, supra note 238, at 872 n.127. Educa-
tional efforts have also been launched at schools:
Increasingly, gay advocates see school and youth programs as critical
not only for gay youngsters, but the gay movement. "I really think it
is the most explosive, fastest developing front in terms of lesbian and
gay activism," said Al Kielwasser, coordinator of Project 21, a natiorial
alliance promoting the inclusion of information about gays in curricula
and textbooks. "What many groups realize," he said, "is that if we are
fighting hate crimes or challenging bigoted legislators-so much of that
stem's from the fact that as children, people are not given fair and
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then this may translate into legal change.2 1 "In the long run, then,
social science research affects the legal process because many social
science findings become part of the conventional culture which all
parties-clients, lawyers, and judges-accept and agree upon. ' ' 252 If
the Supreme Court perceives that social consensus requires the
recognition of gay rights, then it may reconsider its analysis. 253 The
Supreme Court may be reluctant to precede social change, 254 given
accurate information about who we are .... It's just practical for our
community to make sure another generation is not raised to hate."
Tammerlin Drummond & Bettina Boxall, Gay Rights Fight Moves on Campus,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at Al (emphasis added); see Maria E. Odum, Topic
of Homosexuality Shows Diversity in Sex Education, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992,
at bl, for a discussion of the "Children of the Rainbow" and other curricula
regarding homosexuality.
251. Dressler also emphasizes the importance of judicial education:
Frankfurter again has the answer: "Experience attests that ... habits
and feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law and education."
However, the law today is as much the cause of the problem as it is
the possible cure. Education, therefore, not only without but also within
the legal profession-and within the courtroom-must be attempted.
Dressler, supra note 135, at 26.
252. Lochner, supra note 23, at 847; see also Levine & Howe, supra note
22, at 190 (social science is deeply embedded in the mass culture). A poignant
example of the penetration of social science information regarding homosexuality
into mass culture comes from People Magazine:
Sharon Bottoms, 24, of Richmond, Va., the openly gay mother who
lost custody of her son, Tyler, 2, last year after a judge ruled her
conduct "immoral" (People, 9/27/93), won it back on June 21 when a
Virginia Court of Appeals overturned that decision, noting that "the
social science evidence showed that a person's sexual orientation does
not strongly correlate with that person's fitness as a parent."
Sabrina McFarland, Passages, PEOPLE, July 4, 1994, at 54 (emphasis added); see
also Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993), a child custody case
in which the concurring opinion included social science information from a
newspaper article:
Generally, there are no particular developmental or emotional prob-
lems for children raised by gay or lesbian parents. Dr. Michael E. Lamb,
Chief, Section on Social and Emotional Development, National Institute
of Child Health and Human Development, quoted in Daniel Goleman,
Gay Kids Not Psychologically Disadvantaged, Studies Say, MIAMI HER-
AID, Jan. 1, 1993.
502 N.W.2d at 838.
253. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), in
which Justice Blackmun expresses the hope that the Court will soon reconsider
its position on homosexuality.
254. "[T]he Hardwick Court sought shelter from charges of judicial activism
at the expense of a vulnerable homosexual minority." Kohler, supra note 134,
at 141 (footnotes omitted).
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its experience in the segregation and abortion contexts, but should
such change occur the Court may be willing to follow. Writing
about the use of social science in death penalty cases, but with eerie
similarity to gay rights issues, Justice Scalia commented:
The audience for these arguments, in other words, is not
this Court but the citizenry of the United States. It is they,
not we, who must be persuaded. For as we stated earlier,
our job is to identify the "evolving standards of decency";
to determine, not what they should be, but what they are.
We have no power under the Eighth Amendment to sub-
stitute our belief in the scientific evidence for the society's
apparent skepticism.2
5
Thus, ironically, gay individuals may have to take their case to
the public before they can ,win their day in the Supreme Court.
255. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989).
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